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Introduction: 
 
 Travellers strolling around Antwerp are often stunned at the sight of an imposing building on 
Antwerp’s Grote Markt: the city hall. The restoration of a stunning masterpiece that was 
erected in between 1561 and 1565 according to the designs of Cornelis Floris de Vriendt only 
to be burned to ashes during the Spanish Fury, it is a quintessential piece of Renaissance art, 
reminiscent of the city’s Golden Age.1 Its construction was commissioned by the city’s 
authorities as a symbol of the growing prosperity of the financial capital of Western Europe. 
Indeed, no longer dependent on its annual fair,2 Antwerp had already turned into one of the 
most important nodes for international trade in Europe, or in Henry Kamen’s words, the most 
important capitalist centre on the continent.3 Not only did it serve as a market per se, with 
goods being imported and exported via its port, but it also operated as a transit station for 
goods that were to be sold in other European markets.4 Boasting of a population that at its 
peak reached 104.081 inhabitants, of which at least 90.000 were permanent, it was the only 
northern European city other than Paris with a population over 100.000 people.5 
 This competitive environment had caught the attention of merchants aspiring to 
dominate the world’s markets. Alongside their English, German, Portuguese and of course 
Italian colleagues, Spanish6 merchants were amongst the most prominent international 
businessmen in the port of Scheldt. Comprising 10% of the city’s merchants,7 their presence 
in the Low Countries dates back to the 1230s when traders from the Bay of Biscay were 
involved in some transactions with locals. A century later, a handful of Catalans created the 
first Spanish consulate in Flanders.8 Moving from one city to another, the bulk of Spanish 
merchants followed the stream of their partners who left Bruges to establish themselves in 
Antwerp in the late 15th century. Their choice proved rather wise, as by the early 1560s about 
                                                          
1 Watkin, David. A History of Western Architecture. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1986. 271-272 
2 Marnef, Guido. Antwerp in the Age of Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis, 
1550-1577. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 3 
3 Kamen, Henry. Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763. New York: HarperCollins, 2003. 77 
4 Gelderblom, Oscar. Cities of Commerce: The Institutional Foundations of International Trade in the Low 
Countries, 1250-1650. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. 32 
5 Marnef, Antwerp in the Age of Reformation. 5 
6 The term Spaniards will be used to refer to any person whose origins (i.e. Basque, Catalan) were somewhere 
within the borders of what is now Spain. 
7Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce. 33. Guido Marnef argues that their number reached 300 merchants as of the 
1550s (See Marnef, Antwerp in the Age of Reformation. 6) whereas Vazquez de Prada believes that they only 
reached that number in the following decade. (In Vázquez De Prada, Valentin. Lettres Marchandes D'Anvers. 
Vol. I. Paris: 1960. 162) 
8 Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol I. 160 
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a third of them controlled the two-way trade with Spain, while still operating in Bruges and 
handling the wool imports that took place from the Flemish city.9 Nevertheless, not all of 
them were rich enough to carry out that kind of business on their own. Indeed, trade on 
commission – a system where a rich distant merchant operated through local colleagues of 
him who acted in his name - “democratised” trade as Michael Limberger argues, bringing 
smaller merchants into play.10 
 One of the most prominent merchants operating in the Low Countries via his agents 
was Simon Ruiz who boasted a vast network spanning throughout all of Europe. Ruiz handled 
his business from Spain,11 a situation that called for daily communication with his agents. 
Born in Belorado, a small Burgalese town, Ruiz established himself in Medina del Campo, an 
already important hub in wool trade, in 1550 and lived there until his death in 1597. 
Fluctuation of prices, market tendencies, shipments of merchandise, sociopolitical events with 
direct or indirect impacts on his business, and even personal matters such as a happy marriage 
or an honourable death, can all be retraced in the  letters his colleagues sent him. As we will 
see in the paragraphs to come, letters from his correspondents in Antwerp offer us a 
comprehensive insight into both his and his partners’ lives and business during one of the 
most turbulent periods in the history of the Low Countries. 
 It was a disastrous war that tore apart any plans businessmen made in the hope that 
prosperity and peace would last forever. A disastrous incident, the iconoclasm of 1566, 
triggered a series of events that escalated an already tense situation beyond any reparable 
point. Turning down the advice of his officials in Brussels, Philip II of Spain decided to 
preserve the heresy laws in his lands in the Low Countries, as well as to claim full authority 
for his Council of State.12 His reluctant to the heretics’ demands attitude culminated when he 
sent the Duke of Alba and his fearsome tercios to suppress those who had revolted. Alba’s 
harsh reputation, his efforts to impose the tenth penny13 as well as his bloodthirsty treatment 
of those whom he believed to be behind the upheaval, were a turning point in this 
                                                          
9 Phillips, Carla Rahn. "Spanish Merchants and the Wool Trade in the Sixteenth Century." Sixteenth Century 
Journal 14, no. 3 (1983): 268 
10 Limberger, Michael. "Economies of Agglomeration and the Golden Age of Antwerp." In Urban Achievement in 
Early Modern Europe: Golden Ages in Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London, edited by Patrick Karl. O'Brien. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 50 
11 Lapeyre, Henri. Une Famille De Marchands, Les Ruiz: Contribution À L'étude Du Commerce Entre La France Et 
L'Espagne Au Temps De Philippe II. Paris: A. Colin, 1955. 68 
12 Darby, Graham. The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt. London: Routledge, 2001. 16-17 
13 This ill-reputed tax, a 10% levy on sales, unified the opposition despite being quickly revoked. See Ibid. 18 
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confrontation. Philip was adamant; he had to control the most precious jewel in his crown,14 
the Low Countries the economic and strategic position of which was of enormous importance 
to his ambitions.15 Little did he know that it would take almost eighty years for the Habsburds 
to acknowledge that they could no longer rule the whole of the Low Countries. 
 The events that are usually referred to as the “Dutch Revolt” or the “Eighty Years’ 
War” in Anglophone literature have been put under scrutiny numerous times by some of the 
most brilliant and prolific historians. An enumeration of even the most important of these 
studies would require a paper all of its own. The bulk of these studies is dedicated to the 
presentation of the events,16 the logistics of the armies,17 as well as its peculiar culture,18 
strategic innovations,19 ideas and political culture,20 etc. There is little doubt that these studies 
are of paramount importance in our effort to fully comprehend what was going on in the Low 
Countries from 1566 to 1648. Nevertheless, it is only possible to do that when we study both 
the incident and the social meaning it bore. Although recent historiography has attempted to 
shed light on the views of Spanish civilians who were physically present in the Low countries 
at the time, there is still a dearth of meticulous research on this particular aspect of the history 
of the Dutch Revolt21.          
 The letters from Ruiz’s associates provide us with much valuable information needed 
to paint a picture of their lives in wartime. Surprisingly enough, the first historian to fully 
appreciate the value of these letters was not Spanish. An American scholar called Earl J. 
Hamilton studied them as early as 1934, in order to enrich his research on sixteenth century 
inflation.22 But historiography had to wait for another couple of decades -until Henri Lapeyre 
                                                          
14 Rodríguez Pérez, Yolanda. The Dutch Revolt through Spanish Eyes: Self and Other in Historical and Literary 
Texts of Golden Age Spain (c. 1548-1673). Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008. 11 
15 Darby, The Origins. 35 
16 See for instance among others Graham Darby’s The origins, Parker, Geoffrey. The Dutch Revolt. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1977. etc. 
17 On the Spanish army, the masterpiece of Geoffrey Parker: Parker, Geoffrey. The Army of Flanders and the 
Spanish Road, 1567-1659; the Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars. Cambridge: 
University Press, 1972. 
18 León, Fernando González De. The Road to Rocroi: Class, Culture, and Command in the Spanish Army of 
Flanders, 1567-1659. Leiden: Brill, 2009. 
19 See among others Hart, Marjolein 't. The Dutch Wars of Independence: Warfare and Commerce in the 
Netherlands 1570-1680. London; New York: Routledge, 2014. 
20 As in Arnade, Peter J. Beggars, Iconoclasts, and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008. 
21 Yolanda Rodriguez Perez tries to paint a picture of the impact this war had on Spaniard’s beliefs and ideas in 
The Dutch Revolt Through Spanish Eyes: Self and Other in Historical and Literary Texts of Golden Age Spain (c. 
1548-1673) 
22 Hamilton, Earl J. American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain: 1501 - 1650. Cambridge (Mass.): 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1934. Cited in Villanueva, 'Oscar Lucas, El Comercio Internacional Castellano a través del 
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used them in his thesis on the family of Simon Ruiz - for this correspondence to become 
popular amongst scholars.23  This paper will be based on a compilation of letters that were 
transcribed by Valentín Vázquez de Prada, a Spanish disciple of Fernand Braudel.24 Vázquez 
de Prada dug in the “Archivo Simon Ruiz” which is located in Medina del Campo, picking out 
almost half of the 2.400 letters that came from Antwerp to Ruiz and his successors, from 1556 
to 162425 Although there is little doubt that Ruiz’s network included other Flemish cities as 
well26, this compilation consists of letters sent from Antwerp. Ruiz had correspondents in 
cities such as Bruges27, which still remained a commercial hub of significant importance. 
Vázquez de Prada studied these letters in order to describe the economic activities of those 
merchants as well as to offer us a broader image of trade during the second half of the 
sixteenth century. Indeed, the vast majority of the brilliant studies undertaken in the following 
half a century that utilised this rich source material were carried out by economic historians.28 
As a result, the precious information on the ongoing war contained in these letters, often plays 
an auxiliary role if it is not completely neglected. The present study will try to examine the 
same letters from a completely different angle, focusing on the merchant’s sayings on the war. 
It goes without saying that their activities as merchants will be scrutinised too, however the 
activities that concern us here are those who were close-connected to the ongoing war.   
 Of course, correspondence is not the only source of information for this period. By all 
means, studying chronicles written by authors such as Mendoza or Cornejo29 offers us an 
illuminating point of view on the war. On the other hand however, these people formed a 
group that in a sense cannot be perceived as a group of civilians sensu stricto. Their task, at 
least when it comes to these texts, was to offer contemporary readers a description of the war. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
puerto de Laredo en la época de Felipe II, según la correspondencia de Simón Ruiz. (PhD thesis, Universidad de 
Santander 2009). 20 
23 Lapeyre, Une Famille De Marchandes. 
24 Vázquez De Prada, Valentin. Lettres Marchandes D'Anvers. Vol. II-IV. Paris: 1960. 
25 In total there are more than 56.000 letters from all across the globe. See www.catedrasimonruiz.es, the 
website of a chair under the auspices of Hilario Casado Alonso that focuses on the history of trade. 
26 Laso Ballesteros, Ángel, “Noticia del Archivo de los Ruiz” in Ángel. Francesco Datini, 1335-1410, Jacob Fugger, 
1459-1525, Simón Ruiz, 1525-1597: Los Legados Histórico Artísticos Y Documentales De Tres Grandes Hombres 
De Negocios. Compiled by Antonio Sánchez Del Barrio. Valladolid: Junta De Castilla Y León, 2009. 183-201.  
27 We know for a fact that a merchant under the name Francisco de Cruzat was communicating with Ruiz 
c.1576. See Rodríguez González, Ricardo. Los Libros De Cuentas Del Mercader Simon Ruiz: Análisis De Una 
Decada (1551-1560). (PhD thesis, Universidad de Valladolid, 1990). 101 
28 For a brief review on the renewed interest of historians on Simon Ruiz see Bennassar, Bartolomé. "Simón 
Ruiz." In Simón Ruiz: Mercader, Banquero Y Fundador, edited by Antonio Sanchez Del Barrio. Medina Del 
Campo: Medina Del Campo: Fundacion Museo De Las Ferias, 2016. 
29 Mendoza, Bernardino De. Comentarios De Don Bernardino De Mendoça: De Lo Sucedido En Las Guerras De 
Los Payses Baxos, Desde En Año De. 1567. Hasta El De. 1577. En Madrid: Por Pedro Madrigal, 1592. And 
Cornejo, Pedro, and Philippe Tinghi. Sumario De Las Guerras Ciuiles, Y Causas De La Rebellion De Flandres. En 
Leon: En Casa De Phelipe Tinghi, 1577. Cited in Pérez Rodriguez, The Dutch Revolt Through Spanish Eyes. 69 
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As they aspired to justify Spanish claims as well as to set an example for the future 
generations, their works clearly display a propagandistic nature. Moreover, since they 
personally followed the campaigns led by Alba, Requesens, Don Juan of Austria and Farnese, 
it was almost impossible to differentiate themselves from the soldiers or the generals of the 
tercios. A mentality similar to those in the battlefields is thus forged, a mentality certainly 
different from that of the merchants who were living there. 
 Although the latter led a very different kind of life, being neither directly nor indirectly 
involved in military operations, they wrote extensively about the war. Their physical presence 
at the theatres of war renders their narratives priceless. Forming a sui generis group, that of 
Spanish civilians who lived in the lands of the “enemy” with whom they had already forged 
strong economic ties and networks, the merchants’ views on the war are an important 
complement to those of the generals, soldiers, chroniclers and religious figures. Let us not 
forget that both their personal lives and their businesses were gravely affected by the war. 
Their “national” interests may have even clashed with their personal ones, putting them in a 
delicate position. The wartime experiences of Spanish merchants can never be fully 
comprehended if the impacts of the Revolt on their means of survival and prosperity are not 
taken into account. As a matter of fact, this study will try to investigate the everyday problems, 
successes, failures, bankruptcies, opportunities and inconveniencies faced by these merchants 
as presented in their letters.  
 There is little doubt that studying correspondence from Early Modernity can be quite 
revealing. People and especially merchants, put considerable time and effort into writing 
letters and keeping in contact with associates living far away. Manuals on letter-writing were 
printed en masse, and addressed merchants in particular30 or the general public.31 According 
to James Daybell, a letter can be informative to modern day students in many ways that go 
beyond the mere words it contains. A thorough examination can inform us about the level of 
literacy of the writer, the route connecting the place of dispatch to the place of delivery, the 
                                                          
30 Trivellato, Francesca. "Merchants’ Letters across Geographical and Social Boundaries." In Cultural Exchange 
in Early Modern Europe. Correspondence and Cultural Exchange in Europe, 1400-1700, edited by Robert 
Muchembled, Heinz Schilling, István György Tóth, Donatella Calabi, Stephen Turk Christensen, Francisco 
Bethencourt, Florike Egmond, and Herman Roodenburg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 84 
31 In the Low Countries alone, prominent scholars such as Erasmus and Lipsius, wrote treatises on letter-writing 
which demonstrates how important this topic was at the time. See Erasmus, Desiderius, Juan Luis Vives, Konrad 
Celtis, and Christoph Hegendorph. De Conscribendis Epistolis .. Mogvntiae: Excudebat Ivo Schoeffer, 1547. 
Lipsius, Justus, R. V. Young, and M. Thomas. Hester. Principles of Letter-writing: A Bilingual Text of Justi Lipsi 
Epistolica Institutio. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996. 
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postmasters through whose hands the letters passed, the delivery conditions, etc.32 His 
meticulous analysis of sixteenth and seventeenth century England has led him to conclude that 
the Early Modern Period can boasts a variety of cultures of correspondence, differing 
according to gender, social status and generation.33 Merchants of course had their own. 
Information was vital for their survival and prosperity. Their correspondence was the 
principal means for the dissemination of information, and their networks ensured that it would 
be available to everyone.34 They were so reliable when it came to events that bore economic 
repercussions that even diplomats used their correspondence as a source for their reports. 
Such was the case for Zaccaria Barbaro, the Venetian ambassador in Naples whose invaluable 
intelligence services relied on the correspondence of merchants.35 The increase in long-
distance trade and the number of sedentary merchants rendered regular correspondence the 
only way for merchants to control their agents. At the same time, letters were used as 
evidence in court, which had a direct impact both on the language merchants used and on the 
things they said; they were bound to their words.36 
 Of course their correspondence would have been of little or even no significance 
whatsoever if it were not based on reliable networks of information. Their business networks 
were of paramount importance when it came to staying informed about news and trends.37 A 
number of studies have shown beyond doubt that merchants relied on each other for 
information,38 and it is fair to assume that any travelling merchant would share the news with 
his colleagues. Indeed, it was through their social circles that they were kept updated, and it 
was in their very meeting points, such as hotels, taverns, fondacos, that this exchange of 
information took place. The more formal their transactions were, the more sources of 
information they could make use of; correspondence between them, letters of exchange, 
accounting books etc., passed on precious information from one businessman to another.39 
But merchants were not patiently waiting for the information to knock on their doors. Their 
                                                          
32 Daybell, James. The Material Letter in Early Modern England: Manuscript Letters and the Culture and 
Practices of Letter-writing, 1512-1635. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
33 Ibid. 26 
34 Infelise, Mario. “From Merchant’s Letters to Handwritten Political Avvisi In Cultural Exchange” in Early 
Modern Europe. Correspondence and Cultural Exchange in Europe, 1400-1700, edited by Robert Muchembled, 
Heinz Schilling, István György Tóth, Donatella Calabi, Stephen Turk Christensen, Francisco Bethencourt, Florike 
Egmond, and Herman Roodenburg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 33  
35 Ibid. 35  
36 Trivellato, “Merchant’s letters across Geographical and Social Boundaries”. 83-84 
37 Infelise, “From Merchant’s Letters to Handwritten Political Avvisi In Cultural Exchange”. 35 
38 See Gelderblom’s convincing analysis in Cities of Commerce 
39 Casado Alonso, Hilario. "Los Flujos De Información En Las Redes Comerciales Castellanas De Los Siglos XV Y 
XVI." Investigaciones De Historia Económica 4, no. 10 (2008): 36. 
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business demanded frequent travel from one place to another and significant public activity. A 
walk down the docks or in the city’s square could prove to be as informative as any letter 
from a colleague.40 Some even had direct contact with Spanish officials and army 
commanders, and through these were informed about the war developments in great detail.41  
 After all, it was not always possible for them to differentiate between news regarding 
the war and that which involved business. Not only because in the mindset of mercantilist 
scholars war was to paraphrase Clausewitz, the continuation of economy by other means,42 
but because the two of them were not always clearly separate. As Echevarría Bacigalupe 
points out, both the Spanish and the rebels put considerable time and effort into hampering 
each other’s trade activities, believing that this could be the key to winning the war.43 
Blockades and privateering were frequently used by strategists as Farnese and William of 
Orange. Nevertheless, trade was not put under extreme duress solely because of direct actions 
against merchants. War created its own reality that was far from idyllic for those who still 
aspired to carry out business. The needs of the armies were the top priority, and both local and 
distant economies worked in large part to provide soldiers with what they needed. Prices rose 
and shortages of basic commodities such as grain were frequent in wartime. Increased 
taxation only added to these crises, making everyone’s life harder.44 Suffice to say that taxes 
such as the tenth penny were not met with joy among merchants. While it is true that some 
merchants profited from war, this depended more on the products they traded than the new 
sociopolitical superstructure created by the war. Even those who supplied the army with 
products such as uniforms did not necessarily profit, if their incomes are compared to those 
they would have generated in peacetime.45 According to Marjolein ‘t Hart however, the 
effects of war on trade are perhaps slightly exaggerated. Not everyone’s situation was 
exacerbated and many of the crises that struck major economic centres such as Antwerp took 
place in wartime without war being their sole or even their principal cause. Depending on the 
circumstances and the advantages or disadvantages of each city or region, war could either 
create business opportunities or doom large groups of people. For instance, in the case of the 
newly born Dutch Republic, as long as these lands were theatres of war, the economy was 
                                                          
40 Trivellato, “Merchant’s letters across Geographical and Social Boundaries”. 88 
41 See Chapter 2 
42 See for instance Silberner’s excellent analysis of Early Modern economic thought in Silberner, Edmund. La 
Guerre Dans La Pensée Économique Du XVIe Au XVIIIe Siècle. Paris: Librairie Du Recueil Sirey, 1939. 
43 Miguel Ángel Echevarría Bacigalupe, "Guerra y economía en Flandes, siglos XVI-XVII" Studia Historica: 
Historia Moderna 27 (2009) 
44 Hale, J. R. War and Society in Renaissance Europe: 1450 - 1620. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
1986. 181  
45 Ibid. 209-232    
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ruined. But the very moment that the rebels drove the Spaniards off their lands, trade was 
revived and the economy of Holland was flourishing. Nevertheless that happened at the 
expense of the hinterland which was struck by recession.46 At the same time, Antwerp’s 
downfall should not be attributed solely to the events that took place between 1566 and 1585. 
Causes outside of the war had already put the city’s prevalence under pressure and war simply 
operated as an accelerator.47  
 To contribute to this discussion, this paper will attempt to answer the following 
questions: How did this group of Spaniard merchants experience the Dutch Revolt? How 
were their lives and core beliefs affected by it and to what extent is their particular 
experience comparable to that of other Spaniards of similar status? In order to tackle them, 
our first step will be to reverse the first question: instead of asking How did the merchants 
experience the war? as if they were active participants in this process, we shall wonder What 
was the impact of war on them? Of all the elements that compose their identity, i.e. place of 
origin, religion, ideas, beliefs, occupation, it is the latter that was primarily affected by the 
war. Therefore our first question will deal with the fate of their businesses during the war. 
Since their very existence, and the reason for their residence in the Low Countries was based 
on the success of their firms, it is only logical to turn our attention to the changes war inflicted 
upon trade. This is still only a part of their actual experience however. All of those material 
changes were reflected in a non-transparent way in their systems of ideas and beliefs. We will 
therefore try to shed some light on this relation between material reality and its perception by 
a particular group of people. Therefore our second question will tackle the topic of the 
merchants’ views on core ideas relating to the war, ideas such as their affiliation towards their 
country, their religiousness, their views on the enemy and on the war as a concept. This can 
only be carried out via a comparative study and our study will attempt a two-dimensional 
comparison, on the one hand comparing their views on the aforementioned topics before and 
after the war, and on the other hand comparing these perceptions to those held by their 
compatriots. The social understanding of any phenomenon is the result of the interplay 
between the material impact of the given phenomenon on the lives of people and their pre-
existing “ideology”. Tracing out this interplay is crucial if we are to extrapolate our 
conclusions and attempt to add to the discussion of civilians’ experiences in wartime.  
 As is the case with every study, this one comes with some limitations. Since the main 
sources for our research are letters a little bit of relativism is needed, as we can never be 
                                                          
46 ‘t Hart, The Dutch Wars of Independence. 176-177 
47 Ibid. 174  
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certain whether our merchants were openly and frankly expressing their opinions or not. After 
all, as Daybell argues, letter writing in that era was seldom a task carried out by a single 
person. Often written by multiple people and addressed to wider audiences, correspondence 
should be discussed in the context of representing a social transaction.48 It was hardly a 
private conversation between a sender and a reader and thus the former had to be extremely 
careful when expressing his opinions on a certain topic, as they were disseminated to the 
social circle of the reader. Therefore, it seems almost impossible for Ruiz’s associates to have 
shared any views that would be deemed as incompatible with those prevailing in Spain. 
Therefore, complementary literature will be consulted in order to determine what parts of 
their writings can safely paint a picture of their actual views. Secondly, the reliability of 
correspondence is bound to the same criticism as modern day journalism is. Being charged 
with the task of informing Ruiz regularly, but having limited sources of information, some of 
the writers’ intelligence might have not been accurate. As Jeannin argues, there was never 
enough time for them to verify their information which, passing from one man to another, was 
subject to alterations.49 Last but not least, important events and significant pieces of 
information are sometimes missing from their narratives. While this absence can be dealt 
creatively in an effort to delineate their priorities in regards to was going on and what they did 
not wish to write about, we have to relativise yet again. A lack of references to a particular 
event might indicate lack of interest as well as lack of reliable sources. The importance of any 
given event as well as their attitudes towards the events must both be taken into account when 
considering this limitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 Daybell, The Material Letter in Early Modern England. 9-23. Not everything was intended for a public 
audience of course. Pierre Jeannin claims that the specifics of all the economic transactions were strictly for the 
sender and the reader only. See Jeannin, Pierre. "La Difffusion De L'Information." In Fiere E Mercati Nella 
Integrazione Delle Economie Europee Secc. XIII-XVIII: Atti Della "trentaduesima Settimana Di Studi", 8-12 
Maggio 2000, edited by Simonetta Cavaciocchi. Firenze: Le Monnier, 2001. 245  
49 Ibid. 246  
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1. Business in Wartime: A window of opportunity or the 
beginning of an end? 
 
“Dios nos dé otros tiempos en que podamos negociar con más quietud y menos rriezgo, si 
conuiene para su seruiçio.”50 
 
 
1.1 Trade under pressure from political priorities and military operations 
 
Ever since Alba’s tercios set their feet in Flanders, normality was disrupted for good. This 
was not only due to the direct impact of war on trade such as battles, sieges, the necessity to 
satisfy the needs of the Spanish army as well as the consequences of its actions. These direct 
impacts, in addition to the byproducts of war i.e. piracy, privateering and blockades led to a 
second wave of indirect implications which were reflected on the unstable prices, the 
disrupted flow of goods and money, and limited entrepreneurial opportunities. Furthermore, 
the unstable international environment and the chain of events that followed the Dutch Revolt 
and further hindered seaborne or overland trade, rendered insurance a risky business and 
slowed down trade.          
 It was evident since the very first days of the iconoclasm of 1566 that commerce 
would suffer from this turmoil. Delays in payments were the first shock51, which was 
followed by panic on the merchants’ side. Hernando de Frías Cevallos, one of Simon Ruiz’s 
correspondents in Antwerp52, refuses to take any risks on behalf of Ruiz and does not carry 
out any kind of business.53 Trade is in tatters. Everyone in Antwerp is petrified that they 
might lose their assets, wealth, and even their honour. Only a royal intervention could 
guarantee that the forthcoming fair would take place.54 Although the Crown was quick to 
reply to these challenges, it is fair to argue that our entrepreneurs did not stand to gain much 
from the ongoing war. On many occasions they felt that their needs were put aside by the 
                                                          
50 “May God give us other times, during which we might negotiate with more ease and with less risk, if that be 
his will.” Martín Pérez de Varrón to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 31/5/1589, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes 
Vol III. 351 
51 Diego Pardo to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 24/9/1566, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol II. 32-33 
52 Cevallos’s relationship with Ruiz dated back to 1563. It went through a serious crisis three years later but the 
two men kept in contact until Cevallos’s departure from Antwerp back to Spain in 1574. See Vázquez de Prada, 
Lettres Marchandes Vol I. 216 
53 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 1-21/12/1566, Ibid. 33-35 
54 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 27/6/1567, Ibid. 36-37 
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Crown. In 1568 five Spanish vessels under threat from Dutch privateers sought shelter in 
England. Queen Elizabeth decided to impound the cargoes which among other goods 
contained a stunning amount of money that was intended to pay for Alba’s tercios. Alba 
responded by confiscating English possessions in Flanders, escalating the conflict that would 
only be settled 6 years later.55 This delay in negotiations infuriates Cevallos, who insinuates 
that Philip could surely intervene in favour of the merchants, but that those in charge do not 
employ all the available and necessary means. His aphorism shows his bitterness: “When the 
reputation of princes is at stake, the interest of merchants are so easily put aside.”56 This 
incident caused much uncertainty and loss of trust within the community. Cevallos was 
patiently waiting for his king’s intervention, which seemed to be the only remedy for this 
disaster, but to no avail.57         
 Alba never ceased to prioritise the needs of his army; a shortage of money was already 
imminent the moment he arrived due to the huge amount of contados he needed for his 
campaign. Being fully aware of this, the merchants were afraid that the war would deplete the 
financial resources of the region.58 This fear tormented Cevallos too. Although in the end the 
payments were made without any trouble, he was still afraid that the next time things might 
not be so favourable for them.59 Writing again in November of 1569, Cevallos was still 
complaining to Ruiz about the situation in the Low Countries. The market in Antwerp is 
bereft of money and the blame was placed on the excessive needs of the Spanish tercios.60 To 
make matters worse, Alba’s 1572 decision to impose taxes on locals took the merchants by 
surprise. Shops are closed in Brussels and the nearby cities as the businessmen could not 
afford to pay the heinous tenth penny. The products remained unsold, people fled to avoid 
taxation and Juan de Cuéllar61, Ruiz’s main correspondent in the early 1570s, was left behind 
to curse those “negras imposiciones”62. While this situation was frustrating, things got 
                                                          
55 Phillips, William D., and Carla Rahn Phillips. "Spanish Wool and Dutch Rebels: The Middelburg Incident of 
1574." The American Historical Review 82, no. 2 (1977). 314-315 
56 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 5/5/1569, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol II. 
55. What is striking here is that Alba handed over the negotiations to a merchant-banker and associate of Ruiz, 
a Genoese called Thomaso Fiesco.  See Read, Conyers. "Queen Elizabeth's Seizure of the Duke of Alva's Pay-
Ships." The Journal of Modern History 5, no. 4 (1933). 454 
57 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 15/3/1566, Ibid. 54 
58 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 18-22/6/1568, Ibid. 44 
59 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 2/10/1568, Ibid. 51-52. Also Hernando de Frías Cevallos 
to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 7/7/1568, Ibid. 46 
60 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 24/11/1568, Ibid. 58 
61 Cúellar came from a family of merchants of Segovian origin. Juán established himself in Antwerp in 1531 and 
was mainly involved in wool trade. He was the correspondent of Ruiz from 1572 to 1576. See Vázquez de Prada, 
Lettres Marchandes Vol I. 217 
62 “Damned taxes”. In Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 19/12/1571, 19/1/1572, Ibid. 78-79 
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completely out of hand when Spain went bankrupt in 1575. Payments were delayed, no 
money was to be found and everyone in the merchant community was anxious and upset.63 
 A shortage of money was hardly an exception in such circumstances. Every time 
Philip’s treasury was pushed to its limits and the army devoured all available resources, 
merchants became victims of these extraordinary conditions. The situation was still critical in 
the years following the 1577 loss of Antwerp to the rebels. Even when some money managed 
to reach the Brabantine port, it was almost immediately smuggled out in specie or via the 
bourse.64 Another wave of shortages started in September of 1581, and were to go on for more 
than half a year.65 The situation could only escalate and six years later they render to trade by 
barter.66 Nevertheless, as Van Der Wee points out the effects of war were not the only reason 
behind these shortages; an unprecedented famine, expectations of a different set of monetary 
policies and speculative exportation of money from Antwerp certainly added to the already 
dire situation.67 Periodic larguesas of money were only sending false messages to the 
merchants and misleading the market.68       
 But it was not just a question of money and taxation for the merchants. The very safety 
of their merchandise was under severe risk during those turbulent years. Even if it did arrive 
in one piece, no one could guarantee that it would be sold at a reasonable price. On the eve of 
the spring of 1574, Cuéllar received complaints from Ruiz about the quality of upholstery the 
former had sent to his partner. He felt compelled to remind Ruiz that the prices were going up 
precisely because the only fabric of adequate quality was extremely expensive. After all, 
everything was expensive there due to the restrictions imposed by the military operations 
upon trade and more specifically on the movement of goods.69    
 Less than six months later Cuéllar mourned his fate. As long as the war went on, 
profits were not guaranteed since prices fluctuated even more than in peacetime, cargos were 
in danger and the costs were high.70 This fluctuation in prices was directly connected to the 
ongoing rebellion, albeit the latter was not the only reason for it; money shortages were a 
further cause. The instability of prices began in the very first years of the war and at the 
                                                          
63 Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 30/10/1575, Ibid.162 
64 Van Der Wee, Hermann. The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy: Fourteenth - 
Sixteenth Centuries. II - Interpretation. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1963. 256 
65 Diego and Pedro de la Peña to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 26/9/1581, 25/4/1582, also Alonso de Palma Carillo to 
Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 6/3/1582, Vazquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol III. 80-104 
66 Martín Pérez de Varrón to Cosme Ruiz and Lope de la Gauna Arniziega, Antwerp, 30/7/1587, Vázquez de 
Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol IV. 174 
67 Van Der Wee. The Growth. 267 
68 Ibid. 243  
69 Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 26/2/1574, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol II. 99-101 
70 Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 8/7/1574, Ibid. 114 
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beginning of 1572 a large number of Spanish merchants had already left Antwerp for France 
since the market was crashing.71 At first prices went down, but were followed by an 
unexpected rise in 157372 only to stabilise again in 1575 for five years.73 Eventually, Antwerp 
entered a long period of decline. From October 1581 onwards trade traffic was reduced, and 
prices skyrocketed once again since the supply of products could no longer boost the 
commercial activity. The departure of the Merchant Adventurers74 for Middelburg marked the 
plummeting of Antwerp’s market.75 Farnese’s operations and the closure of the Scheldt 
proved to be devastating for the local economy and already in 1588 Martín Pérez de Varrón76, 
another partner of Ruiz, admitted that the only kind of business carried out there is asientos.77 
Once Spain’s operations utterly devastated their business, they made them completely 
dependent on the crown for their very survival.      
 Of course one would expect these kinds of losses and troubles in wartime. What made 
the situation even worse were the numerous occasions when soldiers went lawless after a 
prolonged delay in their payments. In 1576 the ill-disciplined Spanish troops stormed 
Antwerp, severely damaging the city’s economy not even sparing the belongings of their 
compatriots as we will see in the following chapter. The damage they caused had various 
long-term effects. For example when the soldiers looted the tapissierspand78, the tapestry 
trade, a field in which the Spaniards were extremely active,79 effectively froze.80 But this was 
just the tip of the iceberg. Between 1568 and 1578, trade was seriously damaged by the 
ongoing military operations. Pirates and mutineers were the main threats to merchants living 
and operating in the Low Countries.81 No wonder many of these merchants, including 
Spaniards, fled southwards to cities such as Rouen which in turn became a major hub in the 
Franco-Spanish trade.82 Indeed, the French city’s authorities granted letters of naturalization 
to no less than 22 Spaniards in the years that followed 1580, a great number of whom were 
                                                          
71 Van Der Wee. The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy. 239-240 
72 Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 26/2/1574, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol II. 99-101 
73 Van Der Wee. The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy. 417 
74 The Company of Merchants Adventurers was a group of English merchants who were operating overseas. 
75 Ibid. 259 
76 Pérez de Varrón was a Basque merchant who established himself in the Low Countries c.1558 where he 
operated his business until his retirement day fifty years later. His commercial activities included the trade of 
species, cochineal, wool, etc.  
77 Martín Pérez de Varrón to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 18/2/1588, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol IV. 
219-220. On asientos see Chapter 2.2. 
78 A sales and exhibition space for tapestries. 
79 Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol I. 163 
80 Van Der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy. 255 
81 Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce. 224 
82 Ironically, it was due to war and trade that Spanish merchants had to leave Rouen in 1585. See Phillips,. 
Spanish Merchants and the Wool Trade. 270 
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previously living in nearby war-torn lands.83 The bankruptcy of 1575 certainly added to that 
movement, as business froze for good and no one dared to carry out any payments. A 
complete loss of trust took over and only accelerated the commercial downfall. In De 
Gaunas’s words: 
“…los ánimos están tan atemorizados, que no se osan rescontrar con nadie ni fiar de 
ninguno.”84 Many merchants who were exposed to loans left Antwerp and others shut down 
their businesses. Those bankruptcies triggered a domino effect of failures, as the businesses 
were closely intertwined. When Gaspar de Añastro fled Antwerp leaving huge debts behind 
him, everyone else there was alarmingly exposed.85 As of 1582, no more than 4 Spanish firms 
were active in Antwerp.86          
 Those who opted to stay had to face another threat, this time for their lives. Añastro’s 
decision to collect the price that was put on Orange’s head was disastrous for the rest of the 
merchants. The de la Peña brothers87 confide to Ruiz that the lives and belongings of all 
merchants, and especially of the Spaniards, were in great peril. Moreover, their reputation was 
gradually declining and so was their credibility. With only four Spanish firms left in Antwerp, 
it was no surprise that they were all suspected of having close ties to Añastro.88 Another 
assassination attempt on Orange, this time successful, further unsettled their lives. Even two 
years after Balthasar Gérard murdered the “loathsome heretic”, Diego Pardo89 advised his 
partner Ruiz to freeze all business in the Brabantine port until the circumstances become more 
favourable for them.90          
                                                          
83 Benedict, Philip. Rouen during the Wars of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 155 
84 “The spirits are so shaken, that no one dares to meet anyone, nor trust anybody.” in Jerónimo Lope de 
Gauna, Nicolas y Lope de Gauna to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 4/4/1576, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol 
II. 189 
85 Diego and Pedro de la Peña to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 31/3/1582, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol III. 
100 
86 Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol I. 163 
87 Diego and Pedro de la Peña came from a family of Medina del Campo which had moved to Bruges in the mid-
sixteenth century. They established their firm in Antwerp in 1578. This firm was expanded in the following 
years, since various members of their family joined it. Pedro’s name no longer appeared in the firm after 1587 
while Diego seems to have returned to Spain by 1590 after his bankruptcy. See Vázquez de Prada, Lettres 
Marchandes Vol I. 223 
88 Diego and Pedro de la Peña to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 25/4/1582, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol III. 
103-104 
89 Pardo himself is a really interesting figure. It is listed that the son of a Juan Pardo became the municipal 
councilor in Bruges in 1574. (See Fagel, Raymond. "Spanish Merchants in the Low Countries: Stabilitas Loci or 
Peregrinatio?" In International Trade in the Low Countries: (14th - 16th Centuries): Merchants, Organisation, 
Infrastructure ; Proceedings of the International Conference Ghent-Antwerp, 12th - 13th January 1997, edited 
by Peter Stabel. Leuven: Garant, 2000. 99) That same year, Fernando de Frías Cevallos left Antwerp for good, 
leaving his business in the hands of Pardo. (See Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Vol I. 216-217) There is no reason to 
assume that these are two different people 
90 Diego Pardo to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 31/7/1584, Ibid. 210 
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 If the murderous attacks commissioned by Farnese made the merchants feel a little bit 
edgy, when Antwerp was turned into a war zone once again a couple of years later they 
utterly  lost their composure. Pérez de Varrón urgently left Brabant for Cologne precisely 
because the latter is a peaceful city,91 while his colleague Diego de Luengas spoke about his 
concern for the imminent siege of Antwerp. Witnessing first-hand Farnese’s encirclement of 
the city and the preparation and deployment of his army, he had no doubt that their business is 
going to suffer even more and prays to God to relieve these lands of all the burdens war has 
brought upon them.92 Pardo himself was considering leaving Antwerp as soon as he 
completed some unfinished business. He advised Ruiz once again to not conduct any business 
in Antwerp while the city’s future was uncertain.93 They were not the only ones to worry 
about the situation in Antwerp however. Hanseatic merchants, shocked by the Spanish Fury 
and its impacts on the market of the Brabantine city, refused to trade there. Seaborne trade 
had been slightly revived ever since the city passed on under Calvinist control from 1577 to 
1585 and it was apparently the only way to connect these lands with Germany. Overland trade 
was severely hampered, and the new siege Spaniards laid upon Antwerp convinced German 
merchants that their presence there was not worth it anymore.94 Even the affluent Italians 
decided that Antwerp was no longer serving their interests and most of them left in the late 
1570s and early 1580s. Among them were many Ruiz’s associates such as the Bonvisis who 
moved to Cologne in 1578 as well as Lamberti who moved to Holland six years later and 
Balbani, who set up his business in Stade around the same time.95Not all the military actions 
of the Crown were seen as a menace however. While peace was most certainly preferred to 
war, in their most pragmatic moments our merchants seemed to believe that it was still best 
for them to operate in lands controlled by Spain. If Cuéllar is a little bit vague when he 
reassures Ruiz that a possible victory for Philip will serve their particular interests as well96, 
the capture of Antwerp fills them with joy. Two months after the end of the siege in 1585, 
Pérez de Varrón re-established himself in Antwerp97. At his return in January of 1587 Pedro 
de la Peña proudly professes to Ruiz that the city is a safer place and that all lives and 
                                                          
91 Martín Pérez de Varrón to Simon Ruiz, Cologne, 21/9/1584, Ibid. 222 
92 Diego Luengas to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 1/8/1584, Ibid. 212 
93 Diego Pardo to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 31/8/1584, Ibid. 215 
94Harreld, Donald J. High Germans in the Low Countries: German Merchants and Commerce in Golden Age 
Antwerp. Leiden: Brill, 2004. 181 
95 Subacchi, Paola. "Italians in Antwerp in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century." In Minorities in Western 
European Cities (Sixteenth-Twentieth Centuries), edited by Hugo Soly and Alfons K.L.Thijs. Bruxelles: Institut 
Historique Belge De Rome, 1995. Nevertheless many of them quickly returned to Antwerp and took part in the 
profitable asientos of the last two decades of the sixteenth century. 
96 Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 26/4/1571, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol II. 68-69 
97 Martín Pérez de Varrón to Simon Ruiz, Cologne, 4/11/1585, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol IV. 52 
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belongings are now protected.98 The Brabantine city was thus again ready to thrive 
economically under the Spanish rule. According to Geoffrey Parker, after a period of decline 
Antwerp reestablished old trade routes and colonial goods such as silk, sugar etc. were again 
flowing through there after 1589.99 To what extent this should be attributed to Spanish rule is 
of course another matter.          
 Every cloud has a silver lining however. The mere presence of troops in Flanders 
opened up quite a few opportunities. As soon as the tercios arrived, the abundance of money 
in Antwerp boosted trade and the fair was flourishing again.100 Only a year later new Walloon 
forces were raised and Cevallos was stunned at the extensive expenses involved. According to 
him, as long as the war drags on the money will be good and the business profitable. His 
optimism is amazing if we consider what actually followed those early days of enthusiasm. 
Even in the years to come though, opportunities did arise every now and then. Even in 1574 
when the calamities of war had already killed all hopes of the merchants, Cuéllar did 
acknowledge that the demands for colourful uniforms rendered cochineal trade, one of his 
areas of expertise, really profitable. 101       
 Marjolein ‘t Hart, studying the impacts of the Revolt on the economy of the Dutch 
Republic, argues that the situation was much more complicated than it might seem. As long as 
Holland was a theatre of war, her economic life, trade included, was undergoing a severe 
crisis. Merchants were fleeing either to the south or to German cities, the Sea Beggars102 
hindered sea trade and marauding troops showed no respect to private properties. Everything 
changed after 1576 when Spanish troops departed from Holland however. But this does not 
mean that every Dutch city profited from the war in total. Quite on the contrary, the centre of 
economy was shifted from old hubs to new ones. Zeeland, for instance, used to profit from the 
trans-shipments required for trade in Antwerp but ever since the Brabantine town fell into 
Spanish hands, this trade declined and the temporary ban imposed in 1598 struck a fatal blow 
to Zeeland’s economy. Trade blockades in the 1590s hindered inland trade and adversely 
affected cities such as Deventer. All in all it is fair to assume that the coast of the Dutch 
Republic benefited greatly from the war, but it is hard to say the same about the hinterland.103
                                                          
98 Pedro de la Peña to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 31/7/1587, Ibid. 137 
99 Parker, Geoffrey. Spain and the Netherlands: 1559-1659 Ten Studies. London: Collins, 1979. 183 
100 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 7/9/1567, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol II. 
40 
101 Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 16/6/1574, Ibid. 111 
102 By this name are known those pirates who were granted letters of operation by William of Orange in 1569. 
Their actions severely damaged both the actions of the Spanish navy and the seaborne trade. 
103 ‘t Hart, The Dutch Wars of Independence. 172-177 
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 In order to better understand this interplay between the needs of the Spanish army and 
the economic activity of the merchants of Antwerp, we need to take a closer look on the 
latter’s loans to the Crown, the asientos. 
1.2 Lending money to the Crown 
             
Sustaining a prolonged war was hardly a feasible task for sixteenth century states. The 
increasing costs could by no means be covered by their unsophisticated fiscal systems and 
they had to render to money borrowing.104 Spain funded her wars mainly via two types of 
loans, juros and asientos. The former were long term bonds paid off by revenues, and 
consequently Philip II never defaulted on them. Asientos on the other hand were short term 
loan contracts signed between the King and his merchant-bankers.105 The asiento was signed 
by both representatives of the king and a team of merchants. The latter had to supply the 
Spanish paymaster with a fixed amount of money (or on many occasions garments), mostly 
through their partners in the Spanish Netherlands. (Asiento de España) An asiento could also 
be signed between the commander of the Army of Flanders and a team of local merchants. 
(Asiento de Flandes)106 Since these loans did not come with any guarantee, it comes as no 
surprise that asientistas were ruined on several occasions.107 Following the general settlement 
of 1577 for instance, they had to write off between 30% and 58% of their loans.108 
Nevertheless, their interest in signing new asientos with Spain continued, despite the fact that 
the latter saw her credibility severely damaged after a number of bankruptcies, the most 
notable being those of 1557, 1575 and 1596.109 After all, a failure of the Crown to repay its 
loans would trigger a clause according to which the annual interest would rise to 10-12%.110
 Simon Ruiz himself was patiently looking for an opportunity to enter into negotiations 
with the king. His first attempt in 1569 was in vain and so was his second one two years later. 
He finally succeeded in 1575 during the extraordinary events that followed Spain’s 
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bankruptcy.111 Indeed, ever since the rebels consolidated their dominance in the seas around 
Zeeland in 1572, Philip found it more difficult to transfer money to the Low Countries and 
therefore had to cut deals with the local merchants.112 Of course, those who were first to profit 
were the affluent Genoese bankers. Their growing influence on the Spanish economy, due to 
the latter's reliance on them, concerned Philip and the bankruptcy of 1575 turned out to be a 
great opportunity for him to cut his ties with them. As an alternative, Philip turned to Castilian, 
Portuguese and Florentine businessmen.113 Some Spaniards were already lending money to 
Philip though. From 1567 to 1573, the likes of Frías Cevallos, Jerónimo Pardo, Hernando de 
Sevilla and of course Diego de Echávarri114 were eager to assist Alba with substantial 
loans.115 In 1573 only, Frías Cevallos, Echávarri and Fiesco jointly lent 400.000 écus whereas 
Cevallos had already lent another 1.200.000 earlier on. Echávarri himself signed a deal for 
another 112.531 écus with the court of the Low Countries in July of 1573 and 33.669 one 
month later with Diego Pardo. Juan de Curiel boasted of a loan that amounted to 1.5 million 
ducats although Priotti suspects him of concealing the name of his partners.116 By the time 
Requesens took over the control of the Spanish army, its need for loans had already increased. 
Nevertheless, only roughly 26% of these asientos were signed in Flanders.117 A firm of 
bankers consisting mainly of Juan Ortega de la Torre and Gregorio Ruiz de Urramendi seems 
to have lent great sums of money to the Crown even before 1575. Spain's bankruptcy led to a 
disaster for Torre and Urramendi. They shut down their firm and returned to Spain118 where 
Torre eventually got back on his feet, taking part in an another asiento in 1587.119 
 Not everyone could enter into negotiations with the Crown. In general, these deals 
were sealed between the Spanish authorities on the one side and a consortium of commercial 
houses on the other. Firms such as those of Juan Curiel de la Torre and Alonso Diaz de 
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Aguilar were deep into this game and hence quite exposed.120 Most of the Spaniards were 
medium scale merchants however who paled in comparison to the Bonvisis or the Balbanis 
for example, and could not lend money to Philip. Some of them though, such as Diego de 
Echávarri and Andrés de la Maza, had the economic capacity to invest in the ongoing war in 
the hopes that they would profit from it. They quickly realised what a risky business it was.
 Unable to fully compensate those who were struck by the bankruptcy of 1575, 
Requesens offered them half of their money back in the form of letters of exchange.121 
Echávarri found himself protesting to Ruiz in November 1575 about Requesens’ 
untrustworthiness, stressing that everyone there has lost their trust in the Crown. His story is 
backed by the de Gaúna brothers who also seemed disillusioned. About a month later, 
Echávarri claimed that since the paymaster is turning a blind eye to their protests, the 
merchants are considering taking action.122 Cuéllar joins this chorus since he sees his own 
interests in danger. Although he had not taken part in any asientos, some of his partners have 
and since they were yet to be compensated, they could not fulfil their obligations towards him. 
This domino effect ensured that everyone was in a precarious situation as one's exposure 
might lead to disaster for another. Cuéllar further argues that Requesens had proven to be the 
unreliable official Echávarri had accused him of being. Nonetheless, most of the Spaniards are 
quite hesitant to cut ties with Requesens. As long as he paid, (and according to Cuéllar he did 
not lack the money to do so), he would receive financial support.123 Others could wait no 
more. On the same day, the De Gaúnas inform Ruiz that they will no longer fund the Spanish 
army. The paymaster has yet to show some kind of proof that he will pay them back and there 
are rumours that Philip himself puts forward his obligations towards them. They conclude that 
this shortage of money is unprecedented inthese lands and many of the payments are carried 
out in cloth.124 The whole business is a fiasco.       
 A few months later Echávarri claims that he is really exposed and there is so much at 
stake that he is prepared even to travel to Spain to sort things out with the Crown. He begs 
Ruiz to intervene, something that as we will see was not such an uncommon practice.125 
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Echávarri’s Odyssey is never-ending. Although in the summer of 1576 he blissfully informs 
Ruiz that they have reached an agreement with the Crown, two months later we find him 
mourning his fate, as he and his associates have yet to be compensated and rely on each 
other's support if they are to meet their business obligations. It is only in the following 
summer that Ruiz hears from him again, only to find out that Philip still owes the Basque 
merchant money. As we have already seen, quitting this business was hardly an option and 
consequently Echávarri, along with de la Maza, signed a new asiento. Nevertheless they had 
given up any hope that the money of the first loan will ever be returned, and simply pray that 
they might be compensated for the second one.126      
 His partner was in no better shape. An apparently influential merchant, former consul 
of the nation in Bruges and de facto leader of the merchants in Antwerp127, de la Maza was as 
exposed to Spain's debts as anyone. Being fully aware of the unreliability of his country, he 
quickly got in contact with the paymaster, Juan Escovedo, who reassured him that although 
the Crown is behind on its payments, he would not lose his money.128 Echávarri confided in 
Ruiz that de la Maza was in a very delicate situation and in desperate need of the money. He 
repeatedly asked Ruiz to intervene if Escovedo did not pay in time. Echávarri himself was 
facing the same trouble. Having convinced some friends of his to take part in these asientos, 
he was now in debt to them. The only way to get their money back, Echávarri maintained, 
was to constantly remind Escovedo of his lord’s obligation. Despite the situation, he does not 
lose trust in the paymaster, who he sees as a man who keeps his promise.129 Ruiz finally 
decides to intervene in favour of his partners, although he only succeeds in securing them the 
money from the second loan. De la Maza receives this news bitterly, insinuating that he was 
expecting much more from his partner in Medina del Campo.130 His situation was apparently 
so insufferable that he keeps on pushing Ruiz to send him proof that the Crown has promised 
him his money back, intending to use this proof in order to back his claims. He states over and 
over again the urgency of his request.131 And while he could see some light at the end of the 
tunnel since he was expected to receive his payment in 1580, he still blamed Ruiz for the 
mess he was in.132 Not only was he suffering from a lack of capital, but it seems that his 
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business partnership with Ruiz was also in peril.       
 As for Simon Ruiz, after 1581 he stopped taking part in asientos since foreigners were 
getting more in more involved in Spanish economy, dominating fields such as the thriving 
wool trade between Burgos and Northern Europe and the international money market.133 From 
that point on, he only offered his services to his trustees, facilitating asientos and negotiating 
with the Crown on their behalf. His Spanish partners in Antwerp seem to have abstained from 
any deals as well, in large part since most of them had already fled the city. In addition, for 
the majority of the 1580s the Spanish army had no real need for Asientos de Flandes. The war 
in Portugal was over, and precious metals coming from the Americas were filling Philip's 
treasury, something that provided the sort of assurances Genoese financiers were asking 
for.134 However, as soon as Antwerp was passed on to Farnese, new asientos were signed 
between the Italian governor and local merchants.135 These new deals were a blessing in 
disguise. On the one hand, they destabilised the market of Antwerp stripping it out of money 
and thus triggering new price fluctuations. On the other hand however, they were deemed 
necessary by people such as Pérez de Varrón. Asientos “regulated” the market, although at a 
first glance this may not appear to be the case. As business opportunities were thin on the 
ground, loans were the only kind of transaction that could secure profits. In addition they 
should be seen as a channel for surplus capital that had stagnated for good. Of course, Pérez 
reminds there was a delicate balance involved. Too many asientos and the market suffered 
from shortages, too few and the market had to deal with an abundance of money.136 
Nevertheless, given the circumstances they consisted of the only profitable choice for 
merchants, and despite Spain's damaged credibility they were also relatively low-risk options 
(if we trust Pérez's words). Almost everyone was trying to find a window of opportunity and 
although Pérez did not seem to be very keen on this idea (because of some non-economic 
concerns), he nevertheless advises the Balbanis to sign an asiento.137 It was not only the 
family from Lucca that took part in these loans however. Other Spaniards such as the 
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Camarenas are eager to do business with the Crown.138 Alonso Camarena appears to have 
taken part in a number of asientos from the 25th of October, 1588 to his final one on the 2nd of 
November of the following year.139 A few months later he also found himself ruined, only to 
stand back up on his own two feet a few years later, and take part in another asiento in 
1595.140            
 Was money borrowing a profitable business after all? It is really difficult to say for 
certain. As we have seen, Philip would not hesitate to default on asientos. In a letter to Ruiz in 
1577, a merchant and agent of Ruiz in Bilbao called Diego de Vitoria states explicitly that 
having witnessed the results of many asientos he considers these loans to be a great risk for 
the merchants and thus an unwise transaction for them. He quickly changes his mind however, 
and only three years later he asks Ruiz to include him in any future deals with the king. Priotti 
argues that these merchants did not simply lend money to the king because they expected to 
profit from the transaction. Appeasing a monarch could guarantee the survival of their 
business in times of war, embargoes etc., while also providing them with the king’s consent 
for the export of royal coin, something that demanded a license. This seems to be the issue in 
the asiento signed between Echávarri and de la Maza and king Philip. This deal authorised the 
exportation of 11.64 million maravedís and the loan itself was considered of secondary 
importance.141 Many creditors of course also stood to profit from the interest from these loans. 
Taking into account delays in the payments (which were more than frequent) and hence the 
interest on the principal, the profit was enormous for those merchants who were eventually 
paid. For instance, Thomaso Fiesco was owed 60.000 escudos, half of which was to be 
returned to him in the Spring of 1569 and the other half in August of the same year. 
Eventually on the 12th of April 1570 Francisco de Lizalde142, the paymaster of Alba’s army, 
paid him the incredible amount of 71.951 escudos.143 In some cases interest rates could be 
tremendous indeed. In 1581, a loan of 100.000 écus from Lope de Arziniega and some of his 
partners (including Ruiz himself) was lent at an interest rate of 22.2%, more than twice the 
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still surprisingly high average of that period.144 The decade following the recapture of 
Antwerp was perhaps the most profitable for merchants who took part in these deals. The 
increased demand for money to fund the campaigns against the rebels and England as well as 
the Spanish intervention during the French Wars of Religion was such that the merchants 
could by-and-large dictate of the terms of the loans.145 But it was not only for Spaniards and 
Italians that loans became such significant transactions. Even local authorities were in need of 
money in order to protect themselves. Such was the case of Antwerp, which had resorted to 
borrowing since the mid-sixteenth century. Their target group was the German nation, which 
moved its focus from trade to financial activities. The events that took place between 1566 
and 1577 weakened the city’s economy however and Antwerp could not pay off its debts. A 
new bankruptcy, this time in 1584, sent a message to creditors that the city could no longer 
satisfy their demands. From that point on all German activity in Antwerp was focused on 
efforts to collect the money they were due.146 For them as for the Spanish and Italians, loans 
were a two-sided coin.         
1.3 Unsafe waters, treacherous lands        
 
The pre-war thriving trade between Spain and the Low Countries was quickly put to the test 
after the revolt broke out. The diplomatic episode between Spain and England in 1568 was 
indicative of what was about to come. Although the two sides reached an agreement England 
continued impounding Spanish cargoes for the next five years, a practice which culminated in 
1571 when a dozen Spanish ships were attacked in the sea between France and the Cantabrian 
coast.147 Spanish merchants had not seen the worst of it yet though. Trade routes between 
Spain and Flanders were insecure and that was deemed unacceptable. As early as 1568 Philip 
commanded all ships that were to sail to Flanders for commercial purposes to ask for a license. 
Those who did not were thus not allowed to transport their precious cargo to the Low 
Countries. Convoys loaded with wool headed for the Flemish ports, hoping that sailing side 
by side they would be able to better protect themselves. Numerous attempts failed, either due 
to bad weather or to the successful tactics of privateers.148 In 1569 Orange went on the 
offensive and granted letters of operation to the infamous Sea Beggars. And ever since the 
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capture of the town of Brielle in 1572 the North Sea was under Dutch control as the Sea 
Beggars effectively blockaded the Flemish ports, a blockade which was only lifted for 
Spanish vessels during the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-1621).149     
 By the late fourteenth century piracy was already a significant source of income for 
many Netherlanders. During the last years of Charles V’s reign the privateers’ fleet was large 
and bold enough to attack trade vessels repeatedly. They mostly targeted French ships but 
after the Dutch Revolt broke out they turned against Spaniards. Between 1584 and 1586 
privateering was at its peak in the Netherlands; the city of Vlissingen on the banks of the 
Scheldt could boast of 50 privateering ships. Although there are records of privateers 
plundering Dutch vessels as well, the bulk of their actions took place against Spanish ships.150 
There were almost no geographical restrictions to their actions; they even tormented Philip’s 
subjects who lived in Rouen.151 Another field these privateers excelled in, was the kidnapping 
of wealthy merchants, further increasing Spanish merchants’ sense of insecurity.152 Adding to 
this perilous environment, the pirates of La Rochelle and Normandy were also operating in 
the nearby waters, making the transfer of merchandise quite a risky task.153 In 1585 alone, 120 
French and English privateers’ ships were operating in the English Channel deterring any 
efforts to connect Northern Europe and Spain.154        
 It comes as no surprise that merchants did not dare to make any type of transactions. 
Their sense of uncertainty was fed by their ever-growing fear that war between Spain and 
England would break out soon and that the sea routes to Flanders would be closed to them.155 
It was in February of 1574 that their worst fears were realised. The capture of Middelburg by 
the rebels and the confiscation of a large stockpile of wool marked a turning point in the trade 
of this precious good between Spain and the Low Countries.156 At this point uncertainty 
turned into an irrevocable loss of trust. No one really dared to undertake any risks, being 
paralysed by the sight of privateers in the North Sea.157 Every kind of cargo was deemed 
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precious by the latter; not even olives were spared.158 The damage that was inflicted upon the 
merchants in the following years is stunning. The privateers of Zeeland alone secured a booty 
that amassed up to 432.000 florins solely from 1575 to 1577.159 It is safe to assume that since 
they mostly targeted merchants from hostile nations, cargoes from Spanish merchants proved 
to be perhaps the primary source of the privateers’ income. The years to come were not any 
better. After 1580 any king fighting against the rebels put his merchants-subjects at great 
risk.160 In practice this further thinned the presence of Spanish vessels in the North Sea and 
maritime traffic was scarcer than ever before between 1583 and 1584.161 In the following 
decade the supply of goods to Flanders could not fulfill the needs of the local merchants. 
Taking wool trade for instance, only a tenth of the wool that used to be dispatched to Flanders 
before the war was arriving annually between 1583-1594.162     
 Finding business opportunities was therefore a tremendous task under such 
unfavourable circumstances. Pérez de Varrón sent a number of letters which state clearly that 
Antwerp could no longer offer such opportunities and this was in large part due to the 
insecurity of the waters.163 Even those who did undertake business found it tough Alonso de 
la Bárzena164 points out the severity of the problem of piracy and takes drastic measures to 
ensure his cargo will reach Laredo safe and sound, chartering a fleet from Hamburg to follow 
the fleet of Lisbon in order to increase its chances of arriving intact at the Spanish port.165 As 
if the action of the Dutch privateers were not enough the English came back into play, 
blocking the naval route to the Low Countries in the summer of 1589. The timing was fatal, as 
it occurred exactly when Philip needed to transfer large sums of money to Flanders. That 
transfer became extremely precarious and the subsequent shortage of money triggered a series 
of consequences. Farnese’s army could not suffer another round of mutinies, and neither 
could the Italian general see off the joint Dutch and English threat without investing in his 
army and fleet. The remedy was obvious: asientos. In such an uncertain environment however 
and with the market in deep agony, such loans only added to the problem by suffocating the 
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market even more.166 As Varrón states in despair, Drake´s naval operations drove the final 
nail into the coffin.167          
 By no means should we assume that the closure of the Scheldt paralysed our 
merchants. Resourceful as they were, they quickly sought another way to continue business 
with their partners. The ports of Hamburg and Nantes replaced those of the Low Countries. A 
standardised practice can be seen in one of Varrón’s letters. To satisfy an order from his 
Spanish partners and for his shipment to arrive safely, he splits it in two; the bags he sends to 
Cosme Ruiz and Arziniega are dispatched from Nantes whereas the garments he sends to 
Simon Ruiz are sent via Hamburg.168 Such strategies did not put an end to the nightmares of 
the Spaniards however. To begin with, both dispatch and insurance costs were now raised as 
the distance the merchandise had to cover and the dangers it may have had to face were 
increased.169 Pardo is quick to inform Ruiz about a new plague - that of tariffs imposed upon 
them by the king of France in the autumn of 1586. Up until then merchants had to pay a one-
off 10% tax on the value of the goods. This new tax practically doubled the fee and was 
applied to all textiles going through Normandy. Prado attributes it to a vindictive decision of 
the French king, who aimed to cut off all routes connecting Spain to the Low Countries and 
avenge the merchants for snubbing the port of Nantes due to the already enormous economic 
burden.170 It was only five months after its implementation that the impact of this tariff really 
hit them. If we take the merchants for their word, there was only a slight margin for profit and 
trade was now barely worth the trouble.171 Indeed, the route through Normandy was the 
shortest one to Nantes. There was another route through Paris but after 1586 the French 
capital was hit by another tax and hence avoided as well.172 The merchants had to find another 
route and of course they did.173 But the longer the distance, the more they had to pay and the 
longer it would take for their merchandise to reach Nantes. Moreover, during the War of the 
Three Henrys the Huguenots took control of the roads to Nantes.174 Pérez de Varrón states 
that should the wars in France go on and the routes remain as treacherous as they were, many 
merchants would move away from Antwerp. In a desperate move, he ordered the goods he 
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was about to send to Cosme Ruiz and Arziniega to be detained in Lille, petrified that they 
would never make it to Nantes. It took him six months to lose all hope and send them to 
Rouen in order to be loaded on the first ship set to sail for Spain.175 Pardo warned Ruiz that 
unless Farnese found a way for Antwerp to be directly connected to Spain again, trade would 
never be revived.176 Hamburg still remained however an option and the merchants seemed to 
have been advising one another to opt for its port177, but as we are about to see the insurance 
costs rendered the German port the most expensive of their options. A seemingly unrelated 
event, the French Wars of Religion had a great impact upon the lives of Spanish merchants 
precisely because of the war in the Low Countries. As the Dutch successfully blockaded 
Flemish ports, Spaniards were exposed to contingencies that under normal circumstances 
would be of minor if of any importance to them. Having to travel through France was one of 
them and thus French problems became their problems too.    
 But darkness did not fall solely upon the head of Spanish merchants. Dutch embargoes 
damaged German trade too. The Fuggers for instance were already protesting in the summer 
of 1584 that the presence and activities of Dutch warships would be the end of commerce in 
those lands.178  And while blockades did not particularly bother Dutch merchants, the latter 
were not immune to the attacks of privateers.179 Nevertheless the war and particularly the 
closure of the Scheldt accelerated an already ongoing process, that of the shift of the epicentre 
of northern trade from Antwerp to Amsterdam. Consequently, in the long-term Dutch 
merchants stood to gain from Antwerp's downfall even if in the short term they suffered 
losses as well.180 It is safe to assume that several groups of merchants were not quite as 
inconvenienced. Italian merchants who were involved in the trade of luxurious textiles, would 
send their merchandise to Italy via various overland routes that were less perilous.181 But 
when it came to the Spaniards, things were clear. Those who lacked the means or the will to 
move were doomed.          
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1.4 The indirect implications: Mail delivery and insurance fees in wartime 
             
It goes without saying that all entrepreneurs operating in the Low Countries had to ensure that 
their firms would be able to survive any type of contingency. Consequently, merchants had 
two additional concerns if they aspired to reduce the risks they were taking. First, it was 
crucial to have access to credible information which came to them mainly (but not solely) in 
the form of letters from various parts of Europe. Equally important was insuring the 
merchandise dispatched to their partners in Spain. Since normality was disrupted however 
neither of these activities followed any predictable rules or patterns.   
 Communicating with Ruiz and with their partners was a daily task for the merchants. 
Both parties had to keep the flow of information going if they were to keep up-to-date with 
the prices of goods, the security of the routes etc. The significance of commercial 
correspondence was such, that merchants assigned the supervision of this activity to their 
consulates which invested a substantial amount of money to make sure that letters would be 
delivered in time. The consulate of Burgos for instance allocated 5% of its budget to this 
task.182 According to Casado Alonso the Castilian consulate in Bruges was renowned for its 
insistence on punctuality; their contracts with post agencies included bonuses for fast 
deliveries and penalties for delays.183 Postal delivery from the Low Countries to Spain was 
conducted either via the sea route or through France. The former was significantly faster, 
although the envoys were less regular rendering this option less appealing. In order to cope 
with the dangers and uncertainties, merchants would send up to three or four copies through 
different routes. Land routes and sea routes could even be combined. What mattered most was 
flexibility and adaptability to the ever-changing circumstances. At the peak of the Religious 
Wars in France, mail was sent by ship from the Bay of Biscay to the Low Countries. When 
the conflict was spatially restricted to La Rochelle, the post was sent to Nantes and then it 
followed a land route to Flanders.184 The optimal route was never the same for more than a 
few years.          
 Indeed, even a sophisticated postal system could not overcome the challenges posed 
by war. The crucial land mass was France and Spanish merchants were heavily reliant on the 
good will of their neighbour, the French King, and of course on a political order that seemed a 
distant possibility in the second half of the sixteenth century. Philip's involvement in the Wars 
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of Religion did not make things easier. Since Philip wanted to avoid the rise to power of a 
Protestant dynasty in France, especially as he was fighting heretics in the nearby Low 
Countries, he rushed in support of the Catholics. Thus, France was no longer a friendly place 
for Spanish mailmen. Cevallos mourned the capture and imprisonment of several of them,  
which meant that the payments for the fair in June would not be carried out. It was at this 
point that they realised how precarious this route was and Cevallos suggested that all mail be 
sent via the sea. On several occasions, not only were mailmen captured, but the letters were 
burnt too and so was the precious information they contained.185 Alba was already aware of 
this situation and sent his personal mailmen by sea.186 His decision is revealing. He opted to 
dispatch his mail via the slowest route despite the urgent nature of his correspondence with 
the Court. That shows that crossing France was no longer an option for Spaniards. Some 
chose to take their chances anyway however. In March of 1569 Cevallos sent four copies, by 
four different paths to Spain in the hopes that at least one would reach Ruiz. His concern was 
genuine as he had not received any mail from Ruiz in the previous five months.187 We can 
only estimate the extent of the damage to business caused by this lack of communication.
 The blockade on the Scheldt a few years later made things even more difficult for the 
merchants. From that point on they were highly dependent on the internal affairs of France. 
When the situation escalated, as it did in the late 1580s due to the War of the Three Henrys, 
they were in severe danger of missing out on precious information. The flow of letters was 
severely disrupted and for several months in 1587 no letters from Antwerp reached Medina 
del Campo. Writing in March of that year, Pedro de la Peña informs his partners that some of 
the mailmen were ambushed by Frenchmen on their way to Antwerp and many letters were 
lost. Some of those letters contained information regarding business conducted in the previous 
three months as well as the price rates for the February fair.188 This was hardly an isolated 
incident. Even in 1589 Pérez mentions that mail travelling all the way from France to 
Antwerp is subject to all sorts of threats and no mailman is safe.189 Pardo's fate was even 
worse. In the summer of 1586 he was trying to start a business with two gentlemen going by 
the names of Torrequemada and Medina. Being unable to charter a ship to dispatch his 
merchandise, he attempts to inform his new partners of this contingency. His pessimism is 
                                                          
185 Ibid. 40 
186 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 25/10-9/11/1567, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres 
Marchandes Vol II. 42 
187 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 15/3/1569, Ibid. 54 
188 Pedro de la Peña to Cosme Ruiz and Lope de la Cámara Arziniega, Antwerp, 18/5/1587, Vázquez de Prada, 
Lettres Marchandes Vol IV. 154 
189 Martín Pérez de Varrón to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 7/1/1589, Ibid. 311-312 
 30 
 
evident when he says that news does not travel fast and no one is kept up-to-date. He had sent 
several couriers, each one following a different road to Spain but he was still waiting for a 
response from his partners. Without it he could take no action whatsoever.190 Clearly, as long 
as they were kept in the dark, they were paralysed.      
 In his work on the flow of information within Spanish merchant' networks, Casado 
Alonso shows beyond any doubt the impact war had on the delivery of mail. He demonstrates 
that military confrontations significantly slowed down the arrival of letters while at the same 
time increasing the cost (see Figures 1 and 2 respectively).191 Cities that lied in war theatres 
watched their postal systems suffocate under the pressure of war. On the one hand, delivery 
times were such that even the most credible information could be outdated by the time it 
arrived at its destination, if it ever arrived of course. In cities such as Antwerp or Rouen, a 
letter could take up to 120 days to be delivered in Spain. The unpredictability and instability 
of the postal system was also a concern for the merchants. Not knowing what to expect and 
the mere act of sending a letter being deemed risky created a rather unstable commercial 
environment. Comparing Antwerp with Genoa can prove quite telling as a merchant residing 
in Genoa knew what to expect. A letter would be delivered in Spain within 35-45 days. At the 
same time, the best-case scenario for those in Antwerp was for their mail to arrive in less than 
10 days, although the average time for delivery was 33 days, and in the most turbulent of 
times this time might be quadrupled. In addition, the fees were more than significant for those 
merchants who opted to operate in war-torn cities. The threats mailmen had to face not only 
increased delivery time, but also increased the rewards. A businessman had to pay up to 190 
maravedis for a letter that might never reach its destination. 
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Figure 1: Mail delivery times to Medina del Campo in days. 
Source: Casado Alonso, Hilario. "Los Flujos De Información En Las Redes Comerciales Castellanas De 
Los Siglos XV Y XVI." Investigaciones De Historia Económica 4, no. 10 (2008): 55 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average cost of sending mail (in maravedís). 
Source: Casado Alonso, Hilario. "Los Flujos De Información En Las Redes Comerciales Castellanas De 
Los Siglos XV Y XVI." Investigaciones De Historia Económica 4, no. 10 (2008): 55 
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 Even more compelling is the case of maritime insurance. The innovative insurance 
techniques that firstly appeared in Italy c.1300 during the so-called Commercial Revolution192 
and imported to the Low Countries in the following decades, proved to be of utmost 
importance to merchants. And while the Anglo-Spanish incident of 1569 was the first sign, 
the capture of Middelburg five years later sent a clear message to the Spaniards who could no 
longer ignore the threats.193 Insurers were of course aware of these threats, and by 1569 they 
had already increased their premiums accordingly. To make matters worse, three years later 
Philip prohibited the insurance of ships against enemy attacks, inflicting a massive blow to 
Flemish commerce.194 The Antwerp Insurance Office, established in 1559, could offer little 
help to the merchants. Although Alba’s efforts between 1569 and 1571 to reform maritime 
insurances proved to be time-resistant195, Van Niekerk casts serious doubts if it ever 
functioned effectively, especially after 1571, and most merchants had to render to the 
Antwerp Registration Office when it came to conflict resolution.196 Insurance was, after all, a 
highly sophisticated tool. The prerequisites to insure cargo were significant, including the 
listing of the name of the captain, the itinerary and the means of transport. The more 
information the insurers had, the better as they could estimate whether it would be profitable 
for them to insure their cargo or not. While fees would of course increase when the cargo had 
to pass through war torn regions or waters patrolled by pirates, the primary criterion that by-
and-large dictated the cost was the distance to be covered. Some tried to minimise the risks by 
commissioning non-Spanish vessels to transport their goods as these were less subject to 
piracy.197           
 Nevertheless there was little they could do, as the generally unstable environment 
pushed insurers to demand higher and higher fees. Before the war broke out, the average fee 
for a shipment going from the Low Countries to Spain was around 5%. However this rate 
quickly doubled, and peaked in the 1580s.198 As shown in Figure 3, insurance fees 
skyrocketed in the years that followed the capture of Antwerp by Farnese. Even sending cargo 
from Nantes to Laredo was deemed precarious. In those cases where the vessels had to travel 
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across the North Sea, the rates were simply not worth it. Indeed, only a few insurers would 
risk covering cargo that was more than likely to be looted and as a result the premiums they 
demanded were barely affordable. Business clearly suffered therefore, as only a few 
merchants would dispatch their merchandise without any assurances that they would not be in 
danger of losing it all. Those who did so, could hardly make a profit. Let us not forget that the 
interests of the merchants were close-knit and losses and debts were contaminating. If one or 
two merchants had their cargo seized, the other merchants (who in most of the cases were the 
ones underwriting insurance policies), could usually afford to cover the former’s losses. But if 
the whole community suffered a massive blow, no one was able to compensate them.199 In 
order for the nation to survive, it had to act very carefully in the insurance market. 
 The case of Diego Pardo is particularly telling. Pardo was trying to send merchandise 
to Spain for a deal he sealed with Ruiz and the two aforementioned businessmen, 
Torrequemada and Medina. In his correspondence, he stresses the extremely high fees due to 
the risk of piracy, reluctant insurers, and the size of his shipment all of which rendered the 
chances of being able to sign an insurance policy rather thin. A few weeks later he joyfully 
declares that he will hire the services of an insurer in Madrid who is significantly cheaper than 
the ones in Hamburg.200 The next letter that reaches Ruiz’s hands is dated a year later and lets 
him know that the ships are about to sail from Hamburg. Unable to cut a deal with the insurer 
in Madrid, he had to accept the fees of insurers in Hamburg. The delay in the dispatch of the 
merchandise is considerable and Pardo hopes that his clients will cover a part of the cost. 
Mourning his fate, he begs Ruiz to intervene as if he is not partly compensated, he will be the 
one suffering the most from this delay, since he had to pay from his own account. Eventually, 
his clients refuse to compensate him, infuriating Pardo, who puts the blame on Ruiz for 
bringing the two sides into contact.201 Not only the deal took more than a year to be 
completed, but Pardo had to pay from his own purse: not only did he lose time and money, 
but his relationship with Ruiz had hit the rocks.  
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Itinerary Date Place of insurance Type of 
merchandise 
Fee 
Lisbon – Flanders 28/1/1573 Lisbon Jewellery(?) 4,5% 
Lisbon – Flanders 28/1/1573 Medina del Campo Jewellery(?) 6% 
Lisbon – Flanders 4/11/1574 Lisbon Salt 4% 
Nantes – Bilbao 25/3/1575 Nantes Textiles 5,5% 
Nantes – Bilbao 25/7/1575 Nantes Textiles 5% 
Lisbon – Flanders 17/4/1576 Burgos Indigo (natural dye) 8% 
Lisbon – Flanders 18/5/1576 Lisbon Indigo 6% 
Calais – Laredo(?) 15/6/1577 Burgos Linen 10% 
Calais – Laredo(?) 26/10/1577 Antwerp Linen 9% 
Calais – Laredo 19/12/1577 Antwerp Textiles 9% 
Zealand – Laredo(?) 22/10/1578 Antwerp Textiles 6% 
Zealand – Laredo(?) 22/10/1578 Antwerp Textiles 6,5% 
Nantes – Bilbao 7/4/1586 Madrid Various 9% 
Hamburg – Laredo 6/5/1586 Antwerp Various 15,5% 
Hamburg – Laredo 3/12/1586 Antwerp Various 15,25% 
Hamburg – Laredo 28/1/1587 Antwerp Copper 16% 
Hamburg – Laredo 9/3/1588 Antwerp Various 15% 
Figure 3: Insurance fees. 
Source: El comercio internacional castellano. p.234-235 
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1.5 Concluding remarks        
             
To sum up the previous discussion, it is fair to conclude that at least when it comes to Spanish 
merchants, the Dutch Revolt proved to be quite a disaster for business. The optimism of the 
early days when the needs of the army boosted trade was followed by the crude reality of war. 
Three main factors are of nodal importance in our case: the massive needs of the army, its 
operations, and finally the perilous roads. The demands of the army for raw materials, goods 
and above all money, effectively paralysed many of the merchants’ activities. By-and-large 
the market was abiding by the rules that were set by those very needs. Fluctuation in the flow 
of money and of prices were the rule rather than the exception. Those who could afford it 
quickly realised that they had to adjust to the new environment and turn their interest to 
money-lending. This was also risky however. Spain defaulted frequently and many of the 
merchants who lent money to the Habsburgs found themselves in a very delicate situation. To 
make matters worse, even those who refused to or simply could not sign any asientos were in 
great danger due to the domino effect stemming from the bankruptcies of local firms. Henri 
Lapeyre in his monumental study of the asientos signed between the Crown and Ruiz and his 
partners provides us with a detailed account of those transactions.202 Nonetheless, his work 
focuses on the asientos themselves and offers room for other students to trace the impact 
those loans had on other local merchants and uncover the effects of these impacts on their 
wartime experiences. In any case, the ongoing war did not offer many alternatives. The 
operations of the Spanish army caused havoc in nearby lands and the resulting uncertainty 
sent many businessmen away. Sieges, retaliations, sackings and blockades became routine, 
and they gradually led all entrepreneurs to realise that their future, did not lie in Antwerp or in 
any other city reeling from the calamities of the war. To make matters worse, the Spanish 
army was exposed on many fronts and the actions of Dutch and English privateers along with 
the consequences of the Spanish intervention in the French Wars of Religion cut off Antwerp 
from the Iberian Peninsula. The waters were controlled by enemy vessels while the travelling 
by land, and especially in the French countryside, was equally dangerous. No one could 
guarantee that merchandise would arrive intact at its destination. As soon as the merchants 
realised this, they resorted to maritime insurance. Nevertheless there was no remedy: the fees 
insurers demanded were kept in line with the tremendous risks they had to take and pretty 
soon the premiums tripled. Mail delivery was stalled or hampered and its cost increased. The 
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stronger the sense of insecurity, the less risks merchants were willing to take and their 
business stagnated as a result. Marjolein ‘t Hart’s observation that war was a disaster for the 
regions caught in the middle is spot on.203 Citizens of cities such as Amsterdam who 
monitored the events from a distance prospered while those in war-torn cities such as 
Antwerp paid the price.  One after another, the vast majority of merchant communities left the 
Brabantine port for good. Does this mean that no one profited from the opportunities created 
by the war?           
 The truth is a little more complicated. While even prominent firms such as the 
Guinigui were not immune to bankruptcies,204 not every businessman in the Low Countries 
failed. The aforementioned tale of Thomaso Fiesco stands out as an example of a merchant 
who managed to secure a massive profit from loans. Geoffrey Parker is right to remind us that 
some military contractors, bankers and sutlers also benefited from the war.205 For the group 
focused on here however, this appears not to be the case however. With a couple of 
exceptions, their social and economic status was not high enough to allow them to adapt and 
profit from the needs of the war. Those who could not allocate any funds to the Spanish cause 
had to sit back and endure the agony. Those who could, lacked the leverage to secure their 
profits however. Unlike the tycoons that lent money to Philip, our merchants were deemed 
insignificant. The only solution to their problems was to run away and re-establish their firm 
in a different place. Not all of them could do this however. Jerónimo de Curiel and his partner 
Diego Bernuy went bankrupt in 1570. The former had to go back to Spain to settle his affairs 
only to come back to Antwerp six years later.206 His case is even more interesting since he 
was an agent of the Spanish Court.207 After 1575 there was another massive wave of failures 
and a large number of businessmen went bankrupt in 1585208 Pedro de la Peña who so 
proudly returned to Antwerp in 1587 was drowning in debt only three years later. He 
embarked upon a series of negotiations in order to pay off his colleagues, which included the 
Balbanis.209 Even those who had the means to move away were faced with a limited set of 
choices. German cities like Cologne were indeed an option, as Pérez de Varrón quickly found 
out. As we have seen, others went to Rouen, but the disasters of war followed them there. It is 
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clear that they could not follow the massive wave of immigration to Amsterdam, a clearly 
hostile city, and consequently many went back to Spain. As Hale argues, we tend to 
overestimate the opportunities offered by war. Profits were circumstantial and had more to do 
with the increased need for the products certain merchants traded in than with an economic 
superstructure created by the revolt. Still, Hale continues, it is precarious to claim that even 
these merchants profited, as only a thorough search through their personal accounts can reveal 
whether their new activities were as profitable as those they were involved in during times of 
peace.210 If we take our merchants’ words at face value, they really had it tough. This misery 
is reflected in the way they described their everyday reality and the pessimism that painted 
their views of the future. They clearly lost all confidence in the Crown, and their patience 
grew thin. The Dutch Revolt turned out to be quite a disaster for them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
210 Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe. 209-232 
 38 
 
2. The war in Flanders: Enemy, identity, and the vanity of war 
 
“A Dios con devoción, al rey con lealtad e a la patria con amor.” – Hernán Pérez del 
Pulgar.211 
 
2.1 Forming an image of the enemy 
 
No attempt to paint a picture of the mindset of the Spanish during the Dutch Revolt can ever 
be complete without a thorough description of the image of the rebels in Spanish eyes. Since 
the two peoples were in continuous contact due to both the political ties and the economic 
relations between them, sixteenth century Spaniards quickly formulated an idea of the 
archetypical Netherlander212. This image consisted of contradictory elements. One the one 
hand we have views such as those of Calvete de Estrella, a scholar in the Habsburg court who 
accompanied Philip on his visit to the Netherlands in 1548 and four years later wrote about 
the people living in those lands. His texts about the Netherlands were an ode to these people 
as he barely mentions any negative characteristics. Quite on the contrary, he believes them to 
be loyal to the king and among his most religious subjects.213 Such a view was widespread in 
Spain prior to the Rebellion214 which explains the shock and the fury of the Spanish when the 
news of the upheaval reached them. Nevertheless, Calvete’s descriptions had a propagandistic 
purpose. Indeed, he was trying to flatter the Netherlanders and demonstrate the magnificence 
of his king; after all, his book was first published in Antwerp. Calvete was an exception to the 
rule however as many Spanish scholars thought differently of their northern trade partners. 
Questioning their definition of morality (which was overly-flexible for the pious Spanish) and 
considering them greedy and arrogant, they believed that all they cared about was Spanish 
gold and consequently that the Spanish were in fact the Netherlanders’ victims.215 Vicente 
Álvarez, a Portuguese household officer of Philip II, takes a middle-ground approach. He 
admits that while they are indeed peaceful, honest, cultivated and industrious, they are not the 
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best Christians the Pope could boast of; six out of ten are “bad ones”, as he claims.216 
 This contradictory picture became much clearer from the very first day of the rebellion. 
The religious fury of the iconoclastic days made the Spanish question the true motives of the 
rebels. Unexpectedly it was Calvete who rejected Álvarez’s aforementioned notion of 
peaceful Netherlanders. He drew inspiration from classic authors such as Tacitus and Caesar 
calling his enemies wild, fierce, and blood-thirsty rebels, in line with their Batavian 
ancestry.217 Diego Pardo, writing to Simon Ruiz on the 17th of August 1566 seems genuinely 
worried and quite suspicious at the sight of nearly twenty thousand Calvinists attending 
sermons while bearing arms.218 While he reassures Ruiz that despite the polemic character of 
the sermons, Philip’s subjects are still loyal to him, only a week later he explodes as the news 
of the desecration of churches reaches him. He insists that those who were behind these 
unholy actions were in fact heretics and that the confrontation is based on religious grounds. 
Those scheming people, Pardo says, made generous promises to the masses and allowed 
everyone to do whatever they pleased, tricking them into joining the iconoclastic campaign.219 
 It therefore comes as no surprise that many chroniclers of the rebellion depicted 
Netherlanders as very naive, deceitful,220 credulous and easily manipulated people that were 
lured by their leaders into forsaking Philip and rebelling against his rightful kingship. Being 
so simple-minded and ignorant, they allowed themselves to be misled.221 Of course 
contemporary scholars have every reason to doubt these accusations, as all evidence points to 
a cold-blooded, rationalistic choice on behalf of the rebels. Wells argues that both the 
noblemen and the Estates quickly realised they were no longer in need of the central 
government and hence of the Habsburg monarchy. All the latter ever did was ask for new 
loans without compensating the Netherlanders for previous ones, while at the same time 
stripping them of their privileges.222 But when it comes to Pardo and the chroniclers, it is clear 
that their anger and disappointment coloured their views. They felt betrayed by the rebels, and 
saw them as ungrateful people who did not appreciate Philip’s clemency and sincere love and 
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interest for his subjects.223 Cornejo, one of the most prolific chroniclers of the war, goes as far 
as to depict Philip as a paternalistic, almost divine figure that takes good care of his subjects. 
He insists that the king is eager to welcome back his prodigal sons, when they realise they 
have been wrong in defying his rule.224        
 But are the Netherlanders really willing to go back to the previous status quo? It 
appears not, since their actions became bolder and bolder as the years went by. Cevallos 
writing on July 7th 1568 seems quite furious with the rebels’ arrogance and describes them as 
cowardly,  shameless, poor and desperate people, so perverse that they aspire to live without 
obedience to any law or any king. He does not consider them a worthy enemy as they are 
really poor and ill-disciplined soldiers with little resilience or courage. Indeed, as he informs 
us, the guard of Bergen went outside the city walls to engage in a skirmish, but as soon as the 
Spanish army entered the city their defense collapsed. God should make them flee, crash and 
burn, as this is precisely what they deserve, concludes Cevallos.225 And how could it be any 
different? The mere sight of the experienced tercios is enough to cause mutinies and to make 
them run away according to Cevallos. It is only natural to wonder how vain they must be to 
believe that they could win the war.226 Cevallos’ comments are quite interesting if we take 
into consideration how his enemies are presented in the war chronicles, where they are 
accused again and again for their arrogance and their unbelievably stubborn idea that they can 
indeed beat the Spanish army. Netherlanders do not seem to share these views. Instead, they 
are bragging and boasting of their military potency, claiming that the tercios are no match for 
their army.227 Cevallos would laugh off at their over-confidence if he was aware of their 
sayings.228 It is doubtful that we could say the same about Juan de Cuéllar. He was the first to 
point out the naval superiority of the rebels that made it difficult for Requesens to capture 
Zierikzee.229 From this point onwards, national pride and arrogance cede their place to 
pragmatism and more composed analyses of the strengths of the enemies began reaching 
Ruiz’s ears.           
 The change in the opinions Spanish merchants held about the Netherlanders who took 
                                                          
223 Rodríguez Pérez, The Dutch Revolt through Spanish Eyes.74 
224 Rodríguez Pérez, The Pelican and its Ungrateful Children. 287 
225 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 7/7/1568, Vázquez De Prada, Lettres Vol II. 46 
226 Hernando de Frías Cevallos to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 2/10/1568, Ibid. 51-52 
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part in the rebellion is remarkable. It was only a few years prior to the war that many of their 
compatriots were praising the industrious and peaceful nature of the citizens of the Low 
Countries. This was no longer the case once the rebellion began as Cevallos failed to find 
anything positive to say about them -and he was not alone. Cuéllar, commenting on the 
negotiations between the rebels and Spain during the last days of 1574, calls the former 
shameless and untrustworthy and thinks of their demands as ridiculous.230 This notion of 
untrustworthy rebels was shared among the merchants who were apparently shocked by the 
actions of the Netherlanders. Jeronimo de Curiel, a man who took a great risk by staying in 
Antwerp and who was facing great danger as he wrote on September of 1576 that he had no 
love or sympathy for his enemies. Brussels’ authorities, now hostile to the Spanish cause,231 
had imprisoned several of his compatriots which he deemed an act of treason. This 
transgression was not circumstantial; quite the opposite. According to Curiel, although the 
rebels’ needs were served under Philip’s governance, they were biding their time until they 
could stab him in the back despite his clement and attentive governance. He argued that if 
they took off the mask the whole world would see their ungrateful and rebellious nature.232 
That very idea of a rebellious nature is omnipresent in the writings of many war chroniclers as 
well. Luis Valle de la Cerda in his chronicles entitled “Avisos en materia de Estado y Guerra 
para oprimir rebeliones o hacer paces con enemigos armados, o tratar con súbditos rebeldes” 
attributed the revolt to an overly ambitious, almost arrogant need of the Dutch people to defy 
Philip’s right to rule them. He went as far as calling them usurpers. For Cornejo, the 
rebelliousness of these people was more a natural tendency rather than a reaction to Philip’s 
modest governance. He argued that this arrogance will be their nemesis, as they clearly 
overestimated their powers and God who punishes conceit would most certainly punish them 
too.233            
 Of course the chroniclers were not expressing their minds freely. Their works were to 
be used for propagandistic purposes in order to justify the war on the one hand and back 
Philip on the other. Nevertheless the inclemency in the words of the merchants and the 
chroniclers did not just fall from the sky; it was rather a common pattern among sixteenth 
century Spaniards. The soldiers of the tercios, most of whom were of course of Spanish origin, 
had a very poor opinion of the Netherlanders. They were not able to differentiate between 
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loyalists and rebels and they called them all, “Lutherans and beggars”.234As for Alba himself, 
he was hardly any different. He felt no pity for the poor devils that were caught in the middle 
of this fight as he deployed the infamous scorched-earth policy. As Hale points out, contrary 
to popular belief, the aforementioned policy was a rather unusual measure that was used by 
the Spaniards predominantly against the Moors of Granada. If it was reserved for the enemies 
of the faith, then it makes perfect sense that Alba justified this policy by explaining to Philip 
that he was only using it because he had to deal with heretics.235 Interestingly enough a man 
who was more adept to speak about heresy than Alba, an Augustinian monk called Lorenzo 
de Villavicencio seemed to have had a more humane approach, advising his king to adopt a 
lenient tactic when dealing with rebels. For Villavicencio, believing that locals are “beasts and 
drunks” instead of “human beings” is misleading, and treating them in a harsh way will only 
unite them against their common enemy, Spain.236 Benito Arias Montano, a polyglot cleric, 
advised Philip to show some leniency as it was evident that the rebels did indeed have a case 
with so many of them accusing Spain of repression. As he argued, they were fighting a fair 
war. Medinaceli’s council237 seconded Montano’s suggestions, if only for more pragmatic 
reasons. They believed that concessions to rebels were the only means to stop this war. 238
 Overall the Spanish image of the rebels might seem a little bit harsh if we take into 
consideration the fact that they believed that the populace was being manipulated. 
Nevertheless they seem rather reserved in comparison to what they say about the nobility. 
Indeed, the chroniclers seemed to believe that one of the primary reasons why the 
Netherlanders revolted was precisely the greed and ambition of these master manipulators, 
their noblemen. All the chronicles portray the latter as indebted and unreliable, and believe 
they are to take all the blame for the mess they caused.239 William of Orange is the main 
target of their attacks. This comes as no surprise. Not only was he the leader of the rebels, but 
he also stood for everything the Spanish hated: he was a traitor both to his master and to his 
faith since he was born and raised a Catholic. In all the chronicles Orange is an unreliable, 
insincere manipulator who united his people against Philip by spreading lies, such as the 
allegation that the Holy Inquisition would be introduced to the Netherlands. Trillo, in his 
“Historia de la rebellion de guerras de Flandes” accuses him of violent acts against other 
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people’s belongings, which Orange committed due to his supposedly greedy nature. 
According to Trillo, the leader of the rebels was pursuing his own interests and his ultimate 
goal was to establish some sort of tyrannical governance. Orange was as much persona non 
grata as the Duke of Alba was for the Dutch.240 Farnese is no less magnanimous, in an edict 
of outlawry which he issued in 1580. In that document he goes as far as to call Orange “a 
hypocrite…a plague on Christendom…an enemy of the human race”.241 No wonder Cornejo 
dedicates himself to writing a response to Orange’s “Apology”, which resulted in an equally 
propagandistic book called “Antiapología”. Cornejo argues Orange did not really embody the 
Dutch passion for liberty but instead deceiving and exploiting his people, presenting the 
Spaniards as the devil in order to lure the locals away from their duty to serve their king. He 
embodies the most heinous characteristics one can name, those of hypocrisy, lies, deceit, 
tyranny etc. He is the one to be held responsible for the unrest, for the poverty he brought 
upon these lands, for the blood that was shed, for Philip’s harsh response.242   
 Orange was also held in low regard by the Spanish merchants. Cevallos was shocked 
by the arrest of all of the noblemen who assisted the rebels, and speaks highly of some of 
them. Nevertheless, he does not fail to mention that Orange had fled to Germany to avoid 
detention. This “furtive, sly act”243  committed by a nobleman is a paradox of its own. How 
can Cevallos respect Orange when he abandons his people only to save himself? He simply 
cannot. He does not even believe he is a decent leader, as he states in one of his letters. When 
Cevallos received news claiming that Orange had passed away he genuinely hoped that the 
rumour was true - not because he was capable of leading his people to victory, as Cevallos 
quickly underlines, but because his death would have a devastating impact on the morale of 
his people, leading them to surrender.244 They really trusted him with their lives, and since 
they are so deceitful and sly according to Cevallos, Orange was the kind of leader they 
deserved.           
 It is worth noting that the Spanish had a hostile approach towards all noblemen and the 
Catholics among them are not spared this hostility. Indeed, the Counts of Egmont and Horne, 
close associates to both Orange and Alba, were criticised for their role in the wave of 
iconoclasm. The tragic execution of these men moved a few Spanish scholars. Some 
chroniclers such as Trillo and Del Río argue that their decapitation was a fair punishment, for 
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they did nothing to prevent the rebellion and quite on the contrary, they encouraged it. 
Nevertheless, it seems that most were rather equivocal at the announcement of their 
punishment. Cornejo and Ulloa argue that they should be seen more as an example of 
noblemen who made a terrible mistake and had to pay for it because Philip had to set an 
example.245 All the pejorative attributes are gone when it comes to those two pious Catholics, 
despite the fact that they had allowed the construction of Protestant temples.246   
 If war chroniclers had to be relatively harsh with Egmont and Horne for political 
purposes, merchants such as Cevallos who were considerably more distant from military 
operations, approached this topic from a different angle. For Cevallos, these counts had 
nothing to do with the heinous heretics. They made a mistake and had to be punished, but they 
were fully aware that their fate was justified and they died an honourable death. Even at the 
scaffold they were true gentlemen, as one would expect from two noblemen.247 After all they 
were deeply loved and respected by everyone and deservedly so. Cevallos finally confesses 
that it was a shame that Egmont was arrested.248 Other civilians were even more merciful. 
Egmont for instance was held in such a high regard by the Spanish, that one of them visited 
his wife only to warn her that her husband was a wanted man and should flee the country as 
soon as possible.249 Here yet again, the importance of religion as a criterion of differentiation 
between those who merely committed a mistake and those who are rebellious by nature is 
evident.           
 Of course the main point of divergence had to do with whether the citizens of the Low 
Countries pledged loyalty to Philip or sided with the rebels. By all means, Spanish chroniclers 
tried to stress that not all Netherlanders fell into the aforementioned category, that of traitors. 
While Cornejo seems to have lost his temper when speaking about the rebellious nature that 
prevails over their logic, all other scholars are fully aware that they should not be so harsh 
with their allies, and they reject Cornejo’s essentialist notions. After all, their support is very 
much needed and appreciated. Hence, we have on the one hand the “lost heretics and rebels” 
and on the other the loyal allies. The latter even continued to be described with all the positive 
characteristics that were attributed to all Netherlanders before 1566.250 It is clear that the 
chroniclers were doing their best to appease the loyalists, and therefore it is unwise to trust 
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them completely if we are to find out whether the Spanish indeed spared the loyal 
Netherlanders from the treatment doled out to their rebellious compatriots.  
 Where did the Spanish merchants stand in this discussion? Unfortunately they have 
nothing to say about those who decided to side with Philip. All their references to the local 
population are limited to those who took up arms against their king. While it might be 
tempting to assume that the misery this rebellion brought upon their everyday lives and 
businesses led them to group the Netherlanders into a single type, this does not seem to be the 
case. Indeed, every single one of the merchants refers to their enemies as “herejes”, “rebeldes” 
or simply “enemigos”. They clearly differentiate between loyal and rebellious Netherlanders, 
and in fact refer to this war as a civil war more than once, rather than a war between two 
separate entities, two different peoples.251 Why this lack of interest in the loyalists then? One 
possible explanation might have to do with the fact that these people were the norm; they 
were not doing anything extraordinary; they obeyed their master and worshipped God as the 
Spanish did. But there is more than that. The very nature of this correspondence made it 
improbable that the merchants would express their opinions about their law-abiding 
neighbours. The merchants were sending these letters to Ruiz to inform him about anything 
that had to do with their common economic interests. The rebels definitely fit into this picture, 
as the war had a profound impact on trade. Why would Ruiz want to know about the peaceful 
populace of the Low Countries? The answer is simple: he would not.    
 The aforementioned stereotypes were dominant in the mindset of the Spanish people, 
even among those who lived several thousands of miles away. During the Twelve Years’ 
Truce, several theatrical plays were dedicated to the Dutch Revolt. Since theatre was such so 
popular in sixteenth-century Spain,252 it is fair to assume that these plays largely shaped the 
views Spanish people had of the loathsome Nordic rebels. Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez makes a 
very interesting point when tracing how these stereotypes were transmitted to the Iberian 
Peninsula. She argues that while in the Low Countries writers put more emphasis on the 
religious aspect of the conflict, their compatriots back in the fatherland deemed the revolt to 
be a political act. For them, Netherlanders were primarily “rebels”.253    
 The case of the merchants is much more complicated and even more interesting. In 
their first letters, the term “heretics” is omnipresent. They paint a picture of a war between the 
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keepers of the true faith and those trying to sabotage the unity of Christendom. As the years 
go by however, in most of their letters they refer to their opponents as “rebels” or “enemies”. 
It is quite probable that during the first years of the war when the memories of the Iconoclasm 
were still vivid in the minds of locals, the merchants perceived the rebels as a bunch of 
hardcore Calvinists who were merely defying the Pontiff and the Rex Catholicissimus. Later 
on they realise that the lines were blurry and that their enemies were not necessarily following 
any of the Protestant doctrines. Since many Catholics had joined their cause and since their 
demands were predominantly political, the rebels could no longer be seen as mere heretics.  
 
2.2 The role of religion         
           
Whether religion was the driving force behind the actions of the rebels or not254, there are a 
few scholars who doubt the impact religion had on the minds of sixteenth century people. One 
might suggest that Spanish merchants had to appear pious in their letters, as they had to paint 
a picture of themselves as proper Spanish businessmen, but there was definitely more to it 
than that. Fernando Frías Cevallos for instance was a devout Catholic. He spent an incredible 
amount of money just to buy a hotel in Antwerp that he allocated to the Jesuits in order for 
them to establish their Company of Jesus in the Brabantine city.255 Jeronimo de Curiel was 
another fine example. He was charged with the compilation of a list of all the merchants who 
operated in Antwerp and had embraced Protestantism.256 Apparently he lived up to Philip’s 
expectations. Not only did he inform the latter of the names of those merchants and of their 
networks which spanned all across Europe (Spain included), but he also advised him to 
impose financial penalties on them. His zeal was tremendous; even the friends of heretics 
were deemed suspicious and everyone who denounced Catholicism was accused of funding 
the rebels.257 While Cevallos and Curiel were just two of the most telling examples Van Der 
Essen argues that merchants are as much concerned about their spiritual status as about their 
material one. They built networks of support based on their common faith and funded the 
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armies who defended the true doctrine.258 They even had some Jesuit and other Catholic 
fathers preaching exclusively for them and the Italian nation of the city.259 Therefore, it was 
only natural for them to have been devastated at the actions of the angry Protestant lot during 
the turbulent days of iconoclasm. Writing about the Catholic population of Ghent, Judith 
Pollmann gives a precious description of their reactions following the heretics’ wrath. 
According to her, they could hardly process the disaster that had fallen upon their faith. With 
their churches burnt, desecrated and plundered by the furious Protestant lot, they wandered in 
the streets at a complete loss for words. Terrified and shocked, they wondered why there were 
no divine signs warning about this disaster.260      
 Cevallos himself was equally stunned. Since the very first days of the rebellion, he had 
been certain that they were dealing with fearsome heretics. Writing in December of 1566, he 
tells Ruiz how they preached their beliefs, speaking to very large audiences despite the fact 
that they might even preach against each other. They had reportedly vandalized and robbed 42 
churches, and the total cost to the Church of their distractive activities reached up to 250.000 
ducats. It was very hard for Cevallos to believe that a true Christian would turn himself 
against the houses of the Lord. The fear they inspired was such that even the Spanish army 
could not intervene as no one could guarantee that the blood-thirsty heretics would not exact 
revenge on the poor, innocent Catholic citizens.261 Of course such fears did not stop Alba 
from setting up the infamous Council of Troubles to persecute the heretics. After all, for Alba 
and many of the scholars around him, this war was a religious campaign, launched in the 
name of the true faith. Alba confiscated more books and executed more people than the 
notorious Spanish Inquisition did262; after all as he wrote to Philip: 
“As for religion, Your Majesty can be sure that it is entirely uprooted and that it needs to be 
planted again, not even in England was it so ruined.”263 
There is little doubt that Alba was a loyal soldier of the cross. Pope Pius V held Alba and his 
actions in the name of Christendom so high in regard, that in 1569 he dispatched a delegation 
in the Low Countries to present to him two consecrated items: a hat and a sword.264 Baltasar 
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de Vargas, one of Alba’s followers seconded the views of the Spanish general. For Spaniards, 
this expedition was a campaign against heresy and more specifically, against the people who 
had embraced Calvinism.265         
 There were a few moderate voices of course. Although most Spanish, unlike their 
Netherlanders brothers in faith, agreed that there was no room for spiritual confrontations and 
that education was the way to overcome heretic preaching266, others such as Francés de Álava, 
a former Basque ambassador and trustee of Philip II truly believed that Catholics could co-
exist with people of different dogmas and faiths, even with Muslims if they had to. 
Nevertheless Alba begged to differ, warning that those heinous Protestants posed a greater 
threat to Christendom than the Turks.267 Trying to convince Philip to allocate more funds for 
the defense of the Low Countries, he wrote to him: 
“I beat my head against the wall when I hear them talk of the cost here! It is not the Turks 
who are troubling Christendom but the heretics, and these are already within our gates.”268
 The idea of Protestants falling under the same category as Muslims did not wear off 
with time. Martín Pérez de Varrón, an outspoken merchant writing twenty years later than 
Cevallos, accuses the rebels of siding not only with heinous heretics such as the English and 
Henry of Navarre, but also with Turks and Moors.269 For him this was not a simple political 
decision since the motives for this act had to do with the rebels’ profound hatred of 
Catholicism and ultimately, of Christianity. Indeed, every time the rebels launched a 
dangerous campaign to strike a blow in Spanish hopes of supressing the rebellion, the 
merchants felt that the very survival of Christendom was at stake. The news that Orange was 
approaching with a new army, composed largely of German troops reaches Cevallos in April 
of 1569. In his letters, he prays to God to protect his holy Church and to punish the heretics 
who dared to set their eyes on Antwerp.270 Even Juan de Cuéllar, generally moderate and 
distant in his accounts of the rebellion, bursts out in anger when he speaks about his enemies 
and “su maldita religión”.271 The fall of Middelburg was a disaster for Spain, both 
strategically and economically, but Cuéllar claims that it was a blow for Christianity as well. 
The priests, monks and friars of the city were petrified that the rebels would desecrate and 
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plunder the churches, as they had already done on several occasions before that day. It was a 
day to forget for Cuéllar, as the whole of Christendom was in mourning, except for England 
and France, who had on so many occasions helped the rebels.272 In 1574, even the Catholic 
French are indicted by Cuéllar. His message is clear: those who side with the heretics are to 
be considered heretics as well. There was no doubt for the merchants; the war Spain was 
fighting was a Holy War and God would crown it victorious, for a victory for Spain is a 
victory for the true faith.273 Even when the soldiers of God had it tough, he would intervene 
precisely as he did in the Siege of Zierikzee when supernatural phenomena decided the fate of 
the battle. Cornejo and Mendoza described comets flying up in the sky while Trillo saw 
clouds fighting and light prevailing over darkness, equating it to Christianity prevailing over 
heresy.274 The allegory here is compelling: Spain was fighting against the forces of darkness.
 One could argue that the reasons behind this hatred are purely political. The truth 
however, is that the merchants were undoubtedly religious, and religion played an important 
role in their lives, influencing their everyday decisions. Pérez de Varrón left Antwerp for 
Cologne, only to come back a few years later. Although his business was struggling in the 
Low Countries due to the blockade of the Scheldt, he states that a very important reason for 
his reallocation to Cologne was the fact that the German city was Catholic.275 No wonder he 
returned to Antwerp as soon as the city was once again under Spanish control. After all, as 
Pedro de la Peña boasts, from that point on Antwerp went to once again serving God’s true 
will.276             
 Still, the merchants’ anathemas pale in comparison to what war chroniclers had to say 
about their heretic enemies: 
“Their faces did not betray that they were going to die, more often they seemed to be on their 
way to a banquet, so deceived and immersed are these satanic martyrs in their sect.”277 
Cornejo cannot bring himself to see them as human beings who fear and worry and suffer. For 
him it is as if they were possessed by a demonic force that turned them into satanic martyrs as 
he calls them, unable to feel anything human, such is their devotion to seeing the Holy Church 
crash and burn. For Carnero, these Protestants were despicable. While Netherlanders were 
                                                          
272 Juan de Cuéllar to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 26/2/1574, Ibid. 99-101 
273 Martín Pérez de Varrón to Simon Ruiz, Antwerp, 10/8/1588, Vázquez de Prada, Lettres Marchandes Vol IV. 
267-268 
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among the first Northern Europeans to embrace Christianity and had proven to be true 
servants of God, at that point they “degenerated to the state of their ancestors”. His comments 
get even more bitter as he goes on: “They have turned into a disgrace, destroying churches 
with their sacrilegious arms…”.278 He does not even call them heretics: they behave as their 
pagan ancestors, for even a heretic would respect a church. Cornejo shares this view when he 
rebuts Orange’s arguments that the rebels demand freedom of conscience. The Spanish 
chronicler quite convincingly argues that it is rather hypocritical for the rebels to say such a 
thing while they desecrate Catholic churches and destroy monasteries and hospitals.279 If the 
aforementioned assessments seem a little bit over the edge, Ramón in his theatrical play “Don 
Juan de Austria en Flandes” goes well beyond that. He groups the wars of Spain against the 
Turks, the Moors and the Netherlanders into a single struggle in the name of Christendom. 
Don Juan himself holds a crucifix that is hit by an arrow, symbolising the pain heretics 
inflicted upon the true faith.280 There is no doubt that this image is profoundly allegoric and 
reminiscent of the Crusades. No arrows were used during the time of the Dutch Revolt. It was 
Muslims who were renowned for using their bows against the Knights of the Holy Cross. But 
for the merchants, in this war it was again the enemies of Christianity who were trying to 
maim it with their diabolic arrows.  
 
2.3 Patriotism or a proto-national identity in sixteenth-century Spain 
             
It is now clear that the Spanish people, and of course the merchants amongst them, had forged 
an identity via negation. Comparing themselves to the Netherlanders, they felt different. After 
all, they were the keepers of the faith, the loyal and honourable subjects of their master. But it 
would be wrong to limit ourselves to this partial identity. It is widely accepted among scholars 
that a sense of a common Spanish identity was already in place in sixteenth-century Spain. 
The latter was of course a union of separate kingdoms, but nevertheless a notion of unity in 
terms of culture and religion was prevalent in the thoughts of Spain’s leaders and the 
expulsion of Jews and Moors that did not convert to Christianity only contributed to this unity. 
The incorporation of Spain into a multiethnic and linguistically diverse empire, only 
strengthened this proto-national bond among the inhabitants of Spain who realized how much 
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they had in common, regardless of whether they lived in Aragon or in Castile. Of course it 
would be inaccurate to claim that Spaniards had lost their devotion to their regional 
particularities. They identified themselves as Castilians or Aragonese but this diversity was 
the unique element that constituted Spanish identity.281 There is no doubt that this identity was 
primarily forged under pressure from external forces and more specifically, from the wars 
Spain had to fight, first against the Moors and later against the Netherlanders. The hatred 
Spaniards inspired to their enemies only aided in building solidarity, offering people from 
different regions of Spain a reason to stand united.282      
 What constituted this Spanish identity? Yet again, Rodríguez Pérez’s analysis of 
chronicles and theatrical plays proves to be very useful here, offering a description of how  
Spanish writers presented themselves. However, we should be careful with this archetype of 
the sixteenth-century Spanish man. Most of these works aspired to persuade their audiences 
that the wars Spain was fighting were just and that they perfectly suited to the nature of her 
king’s subjects. Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas for instance argues that the Spanish are 
proud people that embody all the great values of honourable warriors.283 His work is rather 
normative, as he speaks about the Spanish as they should be, proud descendants of glorious 
ancestors.284 Lope de Vega adds to this notion of the ideal Spanish by stating that the latter is 
brave, courageous, pious, loyal, and ready to sacrifice himself for the glory of his nation.285 
Such a nation cannot give in to the demands of its enemies. It is its holy duty to fight back and 
defend its rights. This sense of belonging to a common fatherland was not limited to those 
who resided in Spain. A sense of duty towards the patria kept their nation at the forefront of 
their minds.286 This is evident in the case of Pedro de la Torre, probably a discharged soldier, 
who was exiled from Bruges after refusing to renounce his king. In one of his letter to the 
Quintanadueñas family, he wonders to himself “How was it possible to renounce his king 
without being disrespectful to his nation?”287. Although the term patria was vague and could 
                                                          
281 Rodríguez-Salgado, Christians, Civilised and Spanish. 234-238. 
282 Fagel, Raymond. “National Identity Under Habsburg Rule: A Comparison Between Spain and the Low 
Countries.” (Unpublished paper presented at the European Social Science History Conference, Berlin 2004). 6-8 
283 Rodríguez Pérez, Yolanda. "Defining the Nation, Defending the Nation: The Spanish Apologetic Discourse 
during the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-1621)." In The Roots of Nationalism: National Identity Formation in Early 
Modern Europe, 1600-1815, edited by Lotte Jensen. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016. 187-188 
284 Ibid. 186-190 
285 Rodríguez Pérez, The Dutch Revolt through Spanish Eyes. 127-128 
286 Gil Pujol, Francisco Xavier. "Un Rey, Una Fe, Muchas Naciones. Patria Y Nación En La España De Los Siglos 
XVI-XVII." In La Monarquía De Las Naciones: Patria Nación Y Naturaleza En La Monarquía De España, edited by 
Bernardo José García García and Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño. Madrid: Fund. Carlos De Amberes, 2004. 41-
42 
287 García Dorao, Correspondencia Internacional de la Familia Quintanadueñas. 350 
 52 
 
be used to refer to their place of origin as well, it was more than obvious that when it came to 
war, Spain was the fatherland. The tercios were already using the term nación to refer to their 
small community. In order to quell mutinies, troops were called on to maintain order through 
an appeal to their common origin. “We are from the same nation as you, all Spaniards”, 
soldiers serving in Holland wrote to their colleagues who mutinied in Aalst. This was not 
even a new type of appeal. In the Italian wars, a commander asked the soldiers to pick up their 
pikes and fight once again since “the whole of that kingdom of Spain, of which we are sons, 
has its eyes fixed on you”.288 It was not only those who were actively participating in military 
operations who had this sense of belonging however. Merchants in Early Modern Europe who 
were residing in lands far away from their birth place felt foreign indeed. They tried to shape 
their environment to be reminiscent of that of their fatherlands, requesting to be recognised as 
unique entities and feeling alien to the culture, language, and customs of their new towns. 
Those feelings were reciprocal, as locals thought of these merchants as suspicious 
outsiders.289          
 Simon Ruiz’s associates were a unique case. It is more than obvious that they did not 
watch the military operations as distant and neutral spectators. The Spanish army was always 
referred to as nuestro ejercito (our army) or nuestra armada instead of merely being the 
king’s army, which it in fact was. A sense of pride can be observed in Cevallos’ incredibly 
detailed letters in the wake of a glorious victory.290 His zeal in narrating the events, results 
and aftermaths of Alba’s campaigns goes to show how much he identified with the Spanish 
cause. Of him it could not have been any different: after all, his country was the land of peace 
and Christianity.291 Of course Cevallos is not the only who takes great pride in the deeds of 
his compatriots. Andrés de la Maza finds it worth mentioning to Ruiz that two unnamed 
Spanish merchants from Antwerp managed to pay off their debts within three days against all 
odds. He says that all the nations there were stunned and they could not help but admire the 
Spaniards for their integrity. “Nuestra nación”, he says, is deemed honourable and 
reputable.292 Nevertheless this love for the fatherland was not expressed only in the good 
times but also in the bad. While it was only natural for them to worry about possible defeats 
for the Spanish army in the Low Countries, Pérez de Varrón’s genuine concern for an English 
naval campaign against Spain in the Iberian theatre is remarkable. We would of course expect 
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him to make use of his network in order to inform Ruiz, but he does not limit himself to that. 
He and his compatriots, as he says, think about Spain every single day. Between April and 
August of 1589, he sends six letters to his colleague in Medina del Campo, in which he 
repeatedly prays to God for Spain’s safety, expressing his concern for England’s initial 
success and his joy at its ultimately unsuccessful attempt to strike a blow at the heart of 
Philip’s empire. A few weeks later, the flow of information is reversed and it is he who asks 
Ruiz to keep them updated about the course of this campaign.293 Nevertheless, this strong 
proto-nationalism is put to the test the moment their interests clash with those of Spain, and 
that moment comes when the war breaks out. 
 
2.4 Level of interest and views on the war 
            
Around the turn of the 16th century wars evolved into broad, prolonged confrontations that 
had a deeper impact on societies, and especially on civilians who suffered the unfortunate fate 
of living in the theatres of war. War was associated with misery, slaughter, plunder, rape and 
destruction and soldiers were deemed a menace regardless of whether they belonged to 
friendly or enemy regiments. On many occasions people had to leave their homelands due to 
the imminent threat of an approaching army, only to come back when peace returned. In 
addition, many casualties resulted from diseases brought upon the local populations by the 
soldiers who were raiding their lands. Cities such as Hondschoote were wiped from the face 
of the earth during the Dutch Revolt.294 While military tactics, the composition of arms within 
regiments, the sizes of armies etc. had all undergone profound transformations, medieval 
notions such as chivalry and military valour still dominated the mindset of people in the 
sixteenth century, shaping their perceptions of war, battles and soldiers.295 This was 
emphasized through the significant production of propagandistic literature narrating the 
glorious victories of the Spanish armies over the enemies of the nation. Books addressing to 
wider audiences such as “relaciones de batallas” and theatrical plays were quite popular and 
aimed at transmitting to the masses ideas and values that justified the actions and interests of 
Spain. Such ideas were associated predominantly with defending the prestige of the king, but 
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also military spirit and the struggle against heresy.296      
 Brian Sandberg argues that for many Early Modern Europeans, battles and sieges were 
a spectacle. Civilians would gather together to enjoy a good siege, as the women of the 
countryside around Le Pouzin did during the siege of the French town in 1628. Indeed, people 
were so familiar with violence that it was omnipresent, even in their comedy.297 In this 
contradictory perception, war was a spectacle and a menace at the same time. The war in 
Flanders was no different. On the one hand it was associated with disaster while on the other 
hand it certainly triggered the interest of the people. It was not only for first-hand witnesses 
who were hypnotised by the sheer brutality of it all. Lope’s plays show a dual, ambiguous 
vision of the war in Flanders. Enchanted by the deeds of the Spanish army, he praises the 
glorious achievements of the soldiers and generals of Spain, justifying the king’s military 
intervention. He has no doubt that war itself is disastrous however, bringing misery upon both 
the soldiers and the inhabitants of the war-torn lands.298 This two-sided perception of the war, 
as hell on earth and as a spectacle at the same time can help us understand how our merchants 
experienced those disastrous years in Flanders.       
 The interest of people such as Cevallos, Cuéllar and Pérez de Varrón in the campaigns 
of both Spain and her enemies is worth noting. Cevallos for instance closely followed Alba’s 
campaign in modern-day East Frisia and was able to present an incredibly detailed description 
of the Battle of Jemmingen to Ruiz. Cevallos seems even to know the exact time the Spanish 
army arrived at the battlefield, which regiments were guarding the camp, etc.299 Whether his 
information is accurate or not, what is stunning is his genuine interest in a battle that took 
place far away, without having the slightest impact on his life and his business. Not only is he 
interested in learning about the operations of the Spanish army, he is eager to offer his 
wisdom and expertise in order to help Ruiz better understand the peculiarities of the war in 
the Netherlands. Indeed, he seems to be aware of the military tactics sixteenth-century armies 
employ: skirmish, the use of artillery, etc.300 Cuellar might have been more down-to-earth and 
less enthusiastic in narration of Alba’s and Requesens’ campaigns, but his network of 
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information was impressive. He claimed to have been receiving mail on a regular basis from 
the Maestro del Campo in Holland, Francisco de Valdés.301 There is little doubt that men like 
Cuéllar would never go to such trouble if it were simply for news about the war. All seasoned 
merchants were fully aware of the impacts this war could have on their business. A blockade 
on a port was enough to cut off all trade routes from Antwerp to Spain, a prolonged campaign 
in Southern Brabant could hinder overland trade and so on. Nevertheless the level of detail 
Cuéllar included in his narrations rules out simplistic explanations for his motivations. 
Moreover, he seemed to have a decent understanding of military campaigns. While others 
might have been petrified at the news that a powerful army of German mercenaries under the 
command of Orange was approaching Maastricht, Cuéllar’s composure is remarkable. He 
briefly goes over the prices for the goods Orange’s army needs, the geomorphology of the 
lands around Maastricht and the weather and goes on to rebut the arguments of those who are 
certain that the enemy would successfully strike a blow to Spain’s ambitions.302   
 This pattern is still evident ten years later. Pedro de la Peña is a very interesting case. 
Despite the fact that he only rarely wrote to Ruiz, it seems that he was quite interested in 
military operations, and was well-informed. Writing from his house in Antwerp, he informed 
Ruiz about all the specifics of a Dutch mutiny.303 One of de la Peña’s colleagues, Alberto de 
Barzena, had equally detailed and sophisticated intelligence about a French campaign against 
the city of Grave.304 Pérez de Varrón was even more engaged. He started writing to Ruiz 
around the same time Francis Drake, a heinous figure in the eyes of the Spanish people, 
undertook action in the North Sea. Pérez de Varrón gathered intelligence regarding Drake’s 
actions, pointing out that Drake had amassed a large and powerful fleet that he intended to use 
against Spain.305 Although unlike Cuéllar he does not reveal his sources, he makes sure Ruiz 
is fully aware of the naval campaign England was about to launch in January of 1588.306 The 
imminent arrival of the Invincible Armada caught his attention, and he rushed to consult his 
sources about the Spanish navy’s expedition, the Battle of Gravelines, and the fate of the 
remains of Medina Sidonia’s fleet.307 He does however question the credibility of his sources, 
as he is not fully convinced that the news he receives is accurate.308 What is of interest here 
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however is the effort he put into trying to collect bits of information in order to paint an 
accurate picture of the war. After all, his pessimism had always turned out to be justified. His 
fears about the strength of the English navy in the Battle of Gravelines only reflected the true 
balance of powers in the given circumstances of the North Sea. Equally justified was his 
concern that Spain would eventually fail to capture Bergen-Op-Zoom, despite being suitably 
prepared.309 Farnese was forced to lift the siege after six fruitless weeks. Pérez de Varrón’s 
sources were after all quite credible.        
 Not only was war a spectacle, one that caught the eye of many people, but it was also a 
glorious event. As one of the heroes in a famous novela morisca proudly confesses, “Ninguna 
cosa despierta tanto los corazones de los hombres, como el continuo ejercicio de las armas”. 
After all, an honourable man had to engage in war as it was unacceptable to spend his time 
fooling around and being lazy.310 The values of patriotism and military spirit were close-knit 
and fed into one another. Being a patriot was all about feeling proud and having a common 
goal: the interests of the Crown.311 One might be tempted to argue that it would therefore only 
be natural for a bunch of Spanish merchants who were living in the lands of the enemy to take 
great pride in the successes of their army. The reality was more complex however. The Battle 
of Jemmingen, a brilliant display of Alba’s tactical brilliance, was received with joy by 
Cevallos, who speaks of a glorious victory for the Spanish. He does not hold back in his 
narration: the Spanish lost no more than ten men, whereas only 500 of their troops managed to 
route 12,000 of Orange’s soldiers. Should one of the latter’s commanders have been late to 
arrive at the battlefield, no enemy would have lived to tell the story.312 This example is quite 
telling of our protagonist’s pride, but on other occasions Cevallos attributed almost 
supernatural abilities to the Spanish soldiers. It was only a few days earlier that he argued that 
a battle just outside of Bergen had resulted in a glorious victory for Spain, as not a single one 
of her soldiers was killed or injured! His optimism is not surprising. He was always certain 
that Spain would eventually prevail, although he was still slightly afraid that the enemy might 
prove to be a strong opponent.313 The odds were still with Spain, and even in 1571 Cuéllar 
spoke confidently about Alba’s chances of suppressing the rebellion.314    
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 But this was perhaps the last moment of optimism for the Spanish merchants. By the 
following year it was evident that this was not just another upheaval, and that the rebels were 
there to stay. Cuéllar seemed to be the first to take notice of this turn of events. Optimism and 
pride gave place to pessimism, weariness, and fear - fear of the impact of the wars in France 
on the Spanish cause,315 or the fact that Spain was waging war in too many theatres for her 
own good.316 Pessimism predominated, both in regards to the prospects for Alba’s army in its 
campaigns against the rebels317 and the looming continuation of a never-ending war.318 His 
weariness can clearly be sensed in his narration of events. Cuéllar no longer celebrates 
Spanish victories or glorifies the deeds of the army. He is surprisingly distant, objective, 
almost neutral in his narration of the battles, presenting various points of view about the 
situation of both armies, the casualties, etc.319 Even on occasions when one would have 
expected him to celebrate the annihilation of the Dutch army, which in a battle against the 
tercios, lost half of its manpower on the battlefield, Cuéllar maintains his cool. The lack of 
emotions in his words is remarkable.320 The interval of Netherlandish rule that started in 1577 
and lasted until the recapture of the city by Farnese is succeeded by a renewed interest in the 
events of the war. Pérez de Varrón yet again offers the most illuminating example of that shift 
of interest. Although his letters are revealing of his passion and genuine concern over 
Farnese’s efforts to control the lands and waters where rebels prevailed, what is even more 
interesting is his unprecedented pessimism. His greatest fear does not concern the rebels 
though. It is the English who scare him the most. He doubts how “invincible” the Armada 
really is, having lost all hope that victory is in Medina Sidonia’s hands. In almost every single 
letter he writes in the first six first months of 1588, he prays to God more than once to guard 
the Spanish fleet.321 And while divine intervention, especially when it comes to a Holy War, 
was something all pious Spanish expected, Pérez’s prayers betray his terror at the thought that 
Spain might fail in her attempt to put an end to the English plans.    
 The merchants’ fear and negativity clearly demonstrate their situation. War had 
become a living hell for them. Cevallos uses a metaphor to describe their feelings in Flanders, 
stating that it is as if they were surrounded by a fence blocking all routes to the city and 
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effectively cutting Antwerp off from her communication and trade networks.322 The vanity 
and brutality of the war is more evident in the letters where our merchants deal with the 
consequences of the revolt in the lives of those who were actively involved in it. As is 
discussed in the following section, a concept of the war as the ultimate plague sent by God 
built up gradually in their minds, especially in view of the collapsing of their economic plans. 
 
2.5 War and People 
 
The merchants’ views on the very people who waged war - commanders and soldiers - are 
revealing. Cevallos, of course, glorified Spanish soldiers, bragging that they (along with the 
Walloons) were the only trustworthy ones. Even when the Germans had proven their 
resilience and effectiveness, Cevallos remarked that they had behaved as if they were 
Spanish.323  Cuéllar adopted a more humane approach when describing the war. His 
increasing displeasure at the almost pointless confrontation might have been why he turned 
his eye to the particular experiences of the protagonists in this war. Soldiers’, generals’ and 
civilians’ lives on the front are the focus of his discourse. As for the soldiers, Cuéllar seems 
rather sympathetic to their particular problems. Whereas a mutiny was detrimental to the 
Spanish cause, he expresses his understanding of the situation, pointing out that the life of a 
soldier is full of misery, hunger, thirst and ultimately death.324 This is not to say that he was 
defending mutineers; quite the opposite in fact. Although he expresses his sympathy, he is 
alarmed at their plundering, and says that they stole as if they were Turks.325 A couple of 
years later, although still expressing his sympathy for the mutineering soldiers, he complains 
that if they had kept on fighting, the war would have already been over.326 Yet again Cuéllar’s 
views are down to earth. His treatment of the soldiers is more pragmatic, as he addresses their 
human nature. For him they are not just war machines that can go on winning one battle after 
another and proudly serve their country even if they have to sacrifice their personal interests 
and endure pain, poverty and humiliation.       
 Comparing his perceptions to those of his contemporary chroniclers only stresses this 
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point. For Ulloa, this war was a fight between the heroic Spaniards and the rebels. In his view, 
to narrate the events of the Dutch Revolt is in fact to narrate the deeds of the brave Spanish 
tercios, whose deeds prove how courageous and disciplined the they are. In fact, their bravery 
is matched only by their magnanimity. Far from being vindictive, they do not seek revenge 
once they prevail over their enemies, nor do they hate them.327 There is not really much to be 
said regarding Ulloa’s depictions, as the atrocities committed by the Spanish army on 
numerous occasions speak for themselves. What is interesting to point out here is that Cuéllar 
seems to be speaking his mind freely, without any ulterior motive. His descriptions of the war 
seem much more realistic than the ones we find in the propagandistic literature of that era. 
Apparently, Cuéllar and the other merchants who abstain from making any derogatory 
remarks about Philip’s troops seem to be the exception to the rule as outlined by Ruff. 
According to him, during wartime civilians despised the soldiery, going as far as murdering 
troops when they had a chance to do so. After all, the soldiers rarely treated their compatriots 
any better than the enemies.328 The merchants saw things differently however. Perhaps they 
identified with the soldiery, themselves being people who dealt with money and consequently 
were able to appreciate someone’s fury at broken promises and delayed wages. Or perhaps it 
was their peculiar status, that of Spanish people living in the lands of the enemy, which 
enabled them to identify with the soldiers and understand their problems.  
 Cuéllar is quite critical of Alba and his management of his soldiers, and places the 
blame for the mutinies solely on the Duke’s shoulders.329 And he is hardly the only one; other 
civilians were disillusioned with Alba’s methods as well. A former admirer of Alba, Benito 
Arias Montano, asked the king to show leniency instead of severity, to go easy on the rebels 
instead of inspiring fear among them. These views were shared by many prominent statesmen 
serving under the Habsburgs, such as Medinaceli and Granvelle. Even Julián Romero, a 
seasoned commander, was perturbed by the brutality shown by Alba and his son Fadrique.330 
 Cevallos, as usual supportive of the Spanish cause, was perhaps the only one to praise 
Alba’s handling of the situation. Writing in November of 1567, Cevallos maintains that Alba 
had taken all the correct measures to stop the rebellion and restore peace under favourable 
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conditions for Spain.331 Requesens, Alba’s successor, was received in praise by Cuéllar who 
held the new commander in very high regard.332 Others focused on the skills of the generals 
instead of their behaviour or their management of the political aspect of the crisis. Cevallos, 
obsessed with war as always, expressed his displeasure at the defeat at Groningen in 1568 in a 
most bitter way. He argues that Count Aremberg’s boldness and carelessness was the direct 
cause of this disaster: Aremberg fought like a knight, and not like a general as he should have 
done.333  Cevallos seems to neglect every other factor that affected the outcome of this battle, 
remaining loyal to the spirit of the era according to which the role of the Great Man was the 
focal point of all historical narratives.334 Nevertheless, it was not solely when these 
commanders delivered that the merchants praised their skills. Pérez de Varrón vehemently 
defends the Duke of Medina Sidonia despite his unsuccessful command of the Armada. Pérez 
claims that at least according to the accounts that have reached his ears, the Duke was not to 
be held accountable for the defeat. According to de Varrón it was almost inevitable; it was 
divine punishment for Spain’s sins, and his nación needed to appease God if she wanted His 
protection.335 Other generals such as Mondragón were greatly praised by chroniclers who 
stress his wisdom, valour and magnanimity,336 although there is almost nothing about him in 
Ruiz’s correspondence. Surprisingly, little is said about Farnese, arguably the most successful 
of Philip’s commanders. Neither is he openly praised, nor is he accused for his reluctance to 
assist in the Battle of Gravelines.337 There is no doubt about his ability to lead Spain to victory, 
and the merchants do seem to trust him, but the absence of any comments is nevertheless 
worth noting. Equally interesting is their ambivalence when it comes to the very acts and 
decisions of the aforementioned generals and soldiers, acts that had an impact on civilians like 
them. Although civilians and soldiers were in touch throughout the course of the war, as on 
many occasions the latter were (in part) housed in the homes of the former, perhaps their most 
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interesting interaction was the sacking of cities. Plundering a town often followed both 
mutinies and successful sieges. Generals either encouraged these atrocities in the hopes that 
they would serve as a reminder that those who do not surrender in a siege may suffer the same 
fate, or they turned a blind eye, considering them a lesser evil if the alternative was to be a 
mutiny. Alba was fully aware of the power of plundering, and since he lacked the money to 
pay his troops in 1572, he channeled their fury into sacking Mechelen. For four consecutive 
days they plundered the belongings of the locals, an act that was questioned and condemned 
by everyone there.338 But agreement among the Spanish commentators was not always the 
case when it came to mutinies. Spanish scholars such as Francisco de Vitoria and Luis de 
Molina did not believe that killing civilians was wrong or even immoral. Although they were 
moderate voices – Vitoria for instance rejected the notion of “Holy War”339 – they argued that 
differentiating between soldiers and civilians was, after all, almost impossible, as the latter 
might well have assisted the former during a siege. Of course, if it was evident that someone 
was innocent it was ill-advised to kill them. However, the condemnation of mutinies was 
based on political and not humanitarian or ethical grounds. Sacking a town was a deplorable 
act according to Molina, as it involved a series of murders, torture and rapes against innocent 
people. Nevertheless, sometimes even the most despicable actions may be justified according 
to the actual needs of the war. If sacking a city could aid your cause, Molina argued that it is 
perhaps for the best to do so.340        
 Propagandistic literature from the Spanish Golden Age went even further. A very 
popular novel of that era justified the sacking and plundering that followed a successful siege, 
as it was deemed a fair prize for the winner.341 This ambiguity can be seen in the merchants’ 
letters as well. When Alba’s tercios sacked Bergen, Cevallos reminded Ruiz that they were 
really careful not to desecrate any of the Church’s possessions.342 While Cevallos had some 
moral restrictions, he was concerned solely with people and belongings that fell under the 
aegis of the Holy See. It is clear that he would not shed any tears for heretics. Whereas the 
harsh treatment of locals by the Spanish troops made Cevallos look the other way, Cuéllar on 
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the other hand was quite severe in his criticism of the aftermath of the siege of Duiveland343 
and was sympathetic towards the citizens of Zierikzee who were starving during the siege of 
the city by the Spanish army.344 Still, even Cuéllar turns a blind eye to massacres if he has to 
pick a side. An outspoken sympathiser of soldiers, the moment Brussels’ authorities state that 
they would treat mutinied soldiers as enemies, he finds the sacking of Aalst reasonable as a 
form of retaliation. After all, Spanish officials such as Julian Romero were detained in 
Brussels and this was deemed an act of rebellion by Cuéllar.345 If we consider the Spaniards’ 
sufferings during the Sack of Antwerp in 1576, it comes as no surprise that from this point 
onwards, no remarks about such despicable acts are to be found in their letters. Atrocities such 
as those committed after the siege of Maastricht, where according to Hale up to a third of the 
city’s population was slaughtered in retaliation,346 or even during the Spanish Fury 347, do not 
seem to concern the merchants. The answer might lie in a clash of interests. On the one hand, 
those who wrote to Ruiz had to be very careful, as their words could easily get them into 
trouble. Since the content of their letters was accessible to more than just their partner, they 
had to appear supportive of Philip’s cause and glorify the actions of the tercios. On the other 
hand, after a certain point they could no longer turn a blind eye on the brutality of the war, 
justifying acts reminiscent of the Sack of Antwerp during which several of them fell victims 
of the soldiers who went berserk.348 Ever since Cuéllar expressed their disgust, the atrocities 
of the tercios were rarely conveyed and if so, they were criticised. That makes perfect sense 
as on the outside they tried to appear calm and loyal to their fatherland whereas on the inside 
they were torn between their affection towards Spain and their genuine and everlasting fear 
that disaster was imminent for them and their families. It was this clash of interests that 
ultimately shaped their views of the Dutch Revolt. 
 
2.6 Personal versus national interests 
 
We have seen so far that the merchants, although pessimistic and disillusioned after a certain 
point, were supportive of the Spanish cause - a Holy War against heretics who defied Philip’s 
rule. Nevertheless, this eagerness gradually faded, as it soon became evident that their 
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prosperity was put into question by the ongoing war. The war was fair, or even necessary as 
Pérez de Varrón put it, but on the other hand it seemed to last forever and its impact on 
business was devastating.349 While there was little doubt amongst them that the rebels needed 
to be punished, they began having second thoughts as to whether Spain should sign a peace 
treaty, even if that meant recognising a certain level of self-governance for the Netherlanders. 
“Glorious victory” gradually ceded to peace at any cost as the one and only goal. On several 
occasions, Cuéllar prays for peace 350 The same can be said of Diego de Luengas 351, and even 
of Alonzo de la Bárzena, despite the fact that when he wrote in 1586, Farnese was winning 
one battle after another.352 It comes as no surprise that de la Bárzena ceases to complain a 
couple of years later, since by that time part of his transactions regarded the provisions of 
Farnese’s army during its mission to support the Armada, something, that meant that even for 
a short period of time, de la Bárzena directly profited from war.353 Pérez de Varrón was torn 
between his national pride driving him to hope for victory 354 and his personal interests which 
dictated peace at any cost.355 He was furious at the stalling of negotiations between Spain and 
England in 1588, and his comments on the English representatives are indicative of his 
feelings. He equates their behaviour to “an interlude of a comedy that intends to entertain the 
king”. Their lust for peace is such that they strengthen their positions in the sea, he comments 
in irony.356 Even Diego de Echávarri, a man who never seemed to bother himself with the war, 
broke his silence to express his happiness and relief that Spain and the rebels had agreed upon 
an apparently temporary pacification in March of 1577.357     
 Many of these merchants took great risks in their efforts to assist Spain. One particular 
merchant called Gaspar de Añastro even took part in a plot to assassinate William of Orange. 
It seems however, that the only motive behind his actions was the fee that he badly needed 
due to severe financial troubles.358 Going back to Cuéllar, there were indeed many moments 
when he seemed to take great interest in campaigns and battles, expressing his hope that Spain 
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would ultimately win. But even in those cases, Cuéllar did not have in mind the suppression 
of the rebellion in full, but only key battles, success in which might facilitate his business. 
Writing in 1572, he reminds Ruiz that half of the Dutch cities are in the hands of the rebels, 
but what is even worse is that they control all of the ports, blocking the entrance to any ship 
they deem to be hostile.359 A year later, he writes that he hopes Zeeland will be rid of the local 
rebels, who do nothing but hinder trade.360 Gorinchem must fall to the Spanish, if only to clear 
a path to Holland.361 His honesty is compelling. As long as Alba’s army captures towns and 
ports of strategic importance to trade, he is a vocal supporter of the Duke’s campaigns. He 
never ceases to complain about the requirements of those campaigns however, such as the 
heinous tenth penny.362 Pérez de Varrón seems to be equally concerned with the reopening of 
the Scheldt to Spanish vessels, hoping that the arrival of the armada will settle this issue for 
good.363            
 Nevertheless, this behaviour does should not make us question their genuine sense of 
belonging to the Spanish nation and their embracing of the common goal of restoring order 
and suppressing heresy. It was only natural for these merchants’ interest in Spain’s priorities 
to grow thin and for their concern for their own matters to grow. To put it in Pérez’s words, 
“…here there is such a shortage of commodities… because the calamities of this wretched 
land so deep in sorrow are so many that they deprive those poor people of every good thing, 
of every kind of substance of human life…”364 Even their own lives were at risk. De la Peña 
states in 1587 that moving from one city to another is still unsafe. The roads are perilous, as 
the war has forced many people to lurk around looking for travellers to rob them of their 
valuables, making it advisable to travel with an escort.365 Idealistic approaches to war were 
crushed under the pressure of the hard reality. For the merchants, the survival of their families, 
their businesses and themselves is what dictated their mindset. It is precisely that mindset that 
contradicted the norms literature aimed to propagate amongst Philip’s subjects back in Spain. 
Scholars such as Navarrete tried to set an example for the youth, creating the image of a brave 
Spanish man, one that would pick war over peace on any given occasion.366 Around the same 
time, on the occasion of the expedition of the Armada, a Jesuit scholar asked ”If the honour of 
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Spain is at stake, what Spaniard would fail to seek the fame and glory of his nation?”367 The 
answer both here and to Navarrete’s bragging is quite simple: those Spanish civilians who 
were experiencing firsthand the terror and vanity of the war. 
 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
 
To sum up, we have been looking at the various aspects of war through the eyes of the 
Spanish merchants. The uniqueness of the group they form can be traced in their writing, 
especially when these are put into a broader perspective and seen as a continuous dialogue 
with the narratives that were quite popular back in their fatherland. Before we drag ourselves 
into this comparison, it is useful to outline the shift in perceptions of the merchants.
 While it might be problematic to outline such a pattern when only dealing with a 
limited number of people, their behaviour is so consistent that we can rule out an explanation 
based on their particular personalities. They all seem to share a common national identity, one 
that is only reinforced by their religious sentiments. They are not only Spanish, but they are 
Catholics as well. Therefore, their hatred towards the rebels is beyond any doubt. Those who 
took up arms against Philip stood for everything they despised. For the merchants, the rebels 
were defying their king and stabbing Christendom in the back. It was only a matter of time 
before God would strike back. Nevertheless, what began as a confident, arrogant approach 
that glorified war, justifying the acts of Spanish soldiers and attributing every kind of 
derogatory characteristics to the enemy, gradually evolved into something completely 
different. It did not take long before the merchants realised that this rebellion was not to be 
taken lightly. The enemies were not as worthless as they originally thought, and they lose 
interest in them quite soon.  This scarcity of references to their enemies points to a change in 
opinion about who was to be blamed: yes, the rebels did defy Philip’s law and their 
blasphemous beliefs deserved punishment, but they were no longer the solely responsible for 
this menace: Habsburgs’ decisions are questioned too. Rodríguez Pérez’s study of chronicles 
and theatrical plays paints a completely different picture. Spaniards who did not reside in the 
Low Countries had no reason to question their king’s handling of the crisis. At the same time, 
they had every reason to hate an enemy that lived so far away and that they can easily 
dehumanise, forgetting that the rebels suffered the same problems as their compatriots, the 
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merchants and soldiers.368 Henry Kamen’s work on Alba offers insight into the mindset of 
certain low-level officials of the Spanish Court in the Low Countries, who appeared to be 
even more sympathetic towards the rebels than our merchants were.369 This variety of 
opinions can be explained if we take into consideration three main factors: proximity to the 
war, the level of risk for those who spoke their minds, and everyday interactions with the 
rebels.             
 A similar change occurred in beliefs regarding the abilities of the Spanish army. What 
had been an army of heroes suddenly consisted of ordinary human beings, soldiers that could 
lose a battle or two, or maybe even the war. The freshness and excitement of the early stages 
of war dissipated as the years passed by, and no resolution was to be seen on the horizon. It 
was only natural that this hypnotic, romanticised vision would disappear and for people to 
become disillusioned. This frustration clearly affected their views. War was no longer a thing 
of glory. It only brought misery, and consequently peace, needed to be found as soon as 
possible, and at any cost. It seems that the medieval notions of war that were still prevalent in 
the late sixteenth century started to be questioned, and Sandberg’s claims of battles being 
quite the spectacle for civilians370 does not seem to apply in this case. Quite on the contrary, 
Hale’s description of the misery wars brought upon the poor populace is verified by the 
content of the merchants’ letters.371         
 It is at this point that their particular interests started to clash with those of Spain, as 
although a prolonged war might eventually lead to the recapturing of all rebellious cities, it 
would also lead to the utter destruction of trade. Their ambivalence when it came to the 
military operations of the Spanish army is telling of that conflict of interests. On the one hand, 
they seemed to genuinely care about the result of the war and the fate of those who took part 
in it, such as the soldiers, generals and civilians. On the other hand, they could not help but 
question the rationale of an everlasting war. As we have seen, this contradiction between their 
socially-inscribed urge to support Philip’s cause and their natural aversion to the atrocities and 
the concern caused by the prolonged duration of the war is the main prism through which we 
can understand their writings.        
 Not all of them seemed to be concerned about the war though. There are dozens of 
letters that do not offer any information whatsoever about the Dutch Revolt. Diego de 
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Echávarri, one of the wealthiest Spanish merchants - if not the wealthiest, had absolutely no 
interest in the operations of the Spanish army, despite the fact that he was involved in a series 
of asientos. Andrés de la Maza, one of his partners in those asientos, sent a significant number 
of letters to Ruiz without making any reference to the war. We can only guess why merchants 
of such calibre did not find it necessary to discuss such events with someone as informed as 
Ruiz. Perhaps their information networks were adequately comprehensive, and they were not 
in need of additional intelligence. It is also possible that they did not find it necessary to be 
the bearers of news about the revolt as they were less dependent on him and did not need to 
seek his favour. Or perhaps they simply did not have any time to waste on topics that were not 
directly connected to their business.        
 Even those who do dedicate some words to letting Ruiz know what was going on in 
those turbulent times fail to mention certain events of significant importance. We have gone 
through all the topics they dealt with, and have often discussed what was left out of their 
correspondence, but this is just a fraction of the information that is missing. They do not 
comment, for instance, on the collapse of the negotiations in Breda despite the fact that they 
longed for peace. Nor do they speak about some of the most important battles, such as the 
Battle of Gembloux. Cuéllar writes a letter on the 25th of November 1576, less than three 
weeks after the Spanish Fury, and still he almost deliberately avoids making any remarks on 
those events, which shook the port of Scheldt. Of course each of these cases must to be 
examined separately in order to determine the reasons behind the silence. Limited access to 
reliable sources of information, the fear of expressing their thoughts openly, the presumption 
that Ruiz might not be interested in a given incident, etc. could all potentially explain the 
missing information. After all, the flow of letters was disrupted between 1576 and 1585, while 
merchants from other nations maintained regular communication with Ruiz throughout these 
three decades. These merchants may have spoken to him about topics their Spanish colleagues 
did or could not.          
 Nevertheless, the Spanish merchants’ letters are precious as they provide us with 
insight into the war that chronicles and propagandistic literature cannot offer. This is precisely 
because these merchants did not have an official status, one that would force them to serve the 
needs of the Crown and promote its interests. They did have their own agendas and were 
certainly careful when writing to a man like Ruiz back in Spain, but there is perhaps a greater 
level of candour and veracity in their words. As the war continued, the aforementioned 
veracity became more and more evident. They did not try to beautify war, nor did they aspire 
to present the Spanish army as an invincible force and the rebels as a bunch of worthless 
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adversaries. Their letters are pivotal in understanding the brutal reality of war in the sixteenth 
century and the misery it brought upon people’s lives. The merchants saw both the generals 
and the soldiers as human beings who could fail, be scared, starve, and suffer, and civilians 
who suffered the unfortunate fate of needing to defend their hometowns as children of God 
who should be treated as such. They were not considered inhuman figures deserving either 
enormous praise for their heroic actions or absolute condemnation for their treacherous nature. 
The merchants’ situation as Spanish people living in the lands of the enemy is unique and 
revealing. They break the stereotype of Spanish men ready to devote their lives to the cause of 
their king, of brave people longing for battles and deeming peace dishonourable. Contrary to 
what we read in García Hernan’s work and in Rodríguez Pérez’s analysis of propagandistic 
literature which rather surreptitiously aspired to present Philip’s affairs as the duties of the 
entire nation and in the interests of Christianity,372 our merchants have no love for the war and 
are eager to renounce the image of Spaniards as ready to sacrifice everything for their 
fatherland.373 All in all their views on the war when compared to those of scholars, have a 
twofold value. On the one hand, they show more emphatically the political purposes that 
drove scholars to write about war and present it in a way that would justify it and move the 
masses. On the other hand, they offer us a more realistic portrait of everyday life in wartime. 
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Conclusion: 
             
We can now go back and connect all the dots. We have studied the evolution of the views of 
our group of merchants throughout the course of the Dutch Revolt vis-à-vis the ongoing 
events and the material reality they encountered. We have also tried to shed some light on the 
ways in which they perceived their experiences and how they expressed them in their own 
words. Their views were largely shaped by their precarious position in the commercial market 
of Antwerp and evolved according to the unfolding of the war.   
 During the first years of the war, our merchants were loyal to their king’s cause. 
Optimistic and proud, albeit worried about the unpredictable nature of the war, they speak of 
Alba's tercios with great admiration. At first, they felt closely affiliated with this army, which 
they saw as their national army. These views are in accordance with the emerging proto-
nationalism or proto-patriotism of the sixteenth century, and demonstrate that this sense of 
national pride was shared among Spaniards regardless of their place of residence and despite 
of their regional identities. In addition, mesmerised by the propagandistic literature that 
circulated en masse (for early modern standards) Spain, they genuinely believed that their 
army was invincible and that their enemies would prove to be no match for the fearsome 
tercios. There was therefore no reason why they should not wait patiently for a glorious 
victory for their patria. Along with these views, they adhered to the notion of a glorious war, 
which was still prevalent in Renaissance Europe. Victories were seen as the result of 
magnificent plans conceived by the most brilliant tacticians and carried out by brave and 
disciplined warriors, the earthly forces of the Divine being guided against the archenemy, the 
heretics. The latter are seen as heinous, untrustworthy and rebellious by nature - people who 
wish to hurt the Holy Church and betray their benevolent and clement king. This hatred is 
restricted to those Netherlanders who decided to side with William of Orange however. The 
rest were seen as pious, loyal subjects and did not seem to be of much interest to the Spanish 
merchants. It was a civil war after all, and the enemy was not attributed any national identity. 
They were simply the devil’s pawns, the sworn enemies of Christendom, a bunch of 
ungrateful, greedy and arrogant rebels. This pre-existing identity confirms the conclusions 
Rodríguez Salgado drew regarding the infantile stages of nationalism in sixteenth-century 
Spain. She paints a picture of a common national identity that superseded the various regional 
ones and went hand in hand with a sense of national duty. As this identity was forged via 
negation in the wake of the final years of the Reconquista, it was only brought back to surface, 
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even reinforced, when the Dutch Revolt broke out 374     
 The fragility of their world of ideas became clear as the years went by, and no solution 
could be seen on the horizon. War lost its charm and became a horrible task some poor devils 
have to carry out. It was a menace to both soldiers and civilians, both Spaniards and 
Netherlanders. Their exaggerated descriptions of the belligerents were gradually softened. 
References to the evil nature of their enemies became increasingly scarce, and at the same 
time they came to see their own people through a more realistic prism. They saw their soldiers 
as human beings just like them, and defeat was now a possibility. While their hatred towards 
the rebels had not completely worn off, they were less likely to be blamed for the disaster. 
The actions and intentions of royal agents and the king himself started to be questioned, shyly 
at first but more vocally in later years. Peace was requested at all costs. Perhaps the turning 
point in this shift from an adamant patriotism to a pessimistic pragmatism was the closure of 
the Scheldt. From that point onwards, the Spanish merchants in the Low Countries gradually 
came to realise two things: First, suppressing the rebellion was not the easy task they had 
believed it to be, and second, their businesses were now in grave danger. While things did not 
necessarily look promising for them even in the first days of the war, their trust that it would 
not drag on for long and the belief that they could secure some profits by facilitating the needs 
of the army was crucial to their composed way of looking at the war. The revolt inflicted a 
number of plagues upon their businesses however. To begin with, it created an unstable 
market with frequent monetary crises, fluctuating prices and shortages of goods. Trade was 
hampered as there were no certainties whatsoever, and everyone was hesitant to carry out 
even the most ordinary of transactions. Moreover, the needs of the army strangulated nearly 
all commercial activities that did not revolve around the war. In addition, the seas and lands 
that connected Brabant to Spain were increasingly perilous. Privateering and blockades cut off 
Antwerp from the Iberian Peninsula, which was the main place of operation for the Spanish 
traders. The brutal actions of the tercios, along with the shift in the main theatre of war to 
Flanders and Brabant only served to terrorise the inhabitants of these lands, whose population 
was shrinking by the day. Finally, the merchants’ networks of information and their maritime 
insurance policies were hampered by the war and its byproducts. The rebellion left the 
Spanish businessmen exposed to any disasters caused by events in the nearby areas, events 
such as the French Wars of Religion, which under normal circumstances would not disrupt 
their commercial transactions. It comes as no surprise that they blame the war in the Low 
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Countries for their misfortune, even when they operate through the ports of France or 
Hamburg. What made them even more certain about this was the fates of other mercantile 
communities in the Low Countries. Donald Harreld proves beyond any doubt that the 
Germans were also in deep shock. Not only did the frequent bankruptcies in Antwerp leave 
them exposed since they were her main creditors, but the uncertain environment that followed 
the Spanish Fury and the perilous roads that were being ravaged by ill-disciplined troops 
pushed them to look for alternative places to set up their businesses.375 Paola Subacchi claims 
that the Italians were also affected by such disasters, fleeing Brabant in mass numbers for 
more peaceful cities.376 The Spaniards were well aware of this, and were equally aware of the 
new business opportunities opening up in Amsterdam, a city that enjoyed the fruits of peace. 
Of all the merchants residing in Antwerp, those who stood to profit from the war were the 
ones of superior socioeconomic status. Since most of the Spaniards were middle-class 
merchants, they were doomed to suffer.       
 It is at this point that we observe a sharp change in their mindset. Their personal 
interests clashed with those of their country, and they became very cynical, expressing their 
sentiments about the war in the most bitter way. At the same time, instead of speaking of a 
glorious victory, they prayed for the war to end, even if this was at the expense of their ruler. 
Their references to the war no longer aimed to transmit news to Ruiz, nor do they speak 
proudly about the successes of the tercios. In their eyes, the army should only fight in order to 
open new business possibilities for them. Therefore no battles, sieges or campaigns were 
narrated unless they were directly linked to their interests. Peace was requested even when the 
course of war favoured Farnese while the enemies were now heinous not because of their 
rebellious and heretic nature, but simply because of their refusal to agree upon a peace treaty. 
This unexpected change in outlook seems to contradict Daybell’s argument that letter-writing 
bore a particular culture and involved a specific ritual that made the sender very cautious. As 
their letters were to be read out in public, Daybell claims that the writers had to take into 
account the fact that their writing had to appear decent by common standards.377 Nevertheless, 
our merchants’ aversion to the war was such that they did not try to hide their feelings. Both 
the Crown and the commanders decided that the needs of their subjects had to be put aside 
and that their actions should serve the interests of King Philip. Now their subjects wanted it 
the other way around, giving the Crown a taste of its own medicine.      
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 Their dynamic perception of the war is emphasised if seen next to the static views of 
chroniclers. The latter seemed to be singing (with only a handful of exceptions) the same tune. 
While it is clear that theatrical plays drew inspiration from the chronicles, the gap between the 
years in which the latter and the former were written would make us expect some differences. 
Alas, what we see is that these texts propagate the same messages, preach the same ideas and 
remind Spaniards of the same duties, as if nothing really happened during that gap.378  
 Does this mean that the merchants were alienated from their motherland? Not quite. 
Their concern for the affairs and safety of Spain, and for Philip's subjects, as well as their 
active participation in certain side operations of their country's army, and the national pride 
they felt (even on a number of seemingly unrelated occasions, as we saw for example in de la 
Maza’s letter on his two colleagues who, against all odds, paid off their debt) speaks volumes 
about their affiliation. Their national identity was rather resistant to shocks. However, they 
prioritised their own interests to the point that they did not seem to care about the result of the 
war. We should not take it for granted that their personal interests and those of the Crown 
could never have been bridged. Obviously a victory for the latter would bring peace and boost 
trade once again. By all means though, trade was not the only thing that occupied the minds of 
the merchants. As long as the royal treasury could stand on its own two feet, Philip would be 
able to compensate the merchant-creditors of his army. In practice of course, our group of 
merchants did not take part in many deals, and even those who did were infuriated by the lack 
of credibility and integrity the Crown was renowned for. For the rest of them, the payments to 
asientistas was important only because the interests of all merchants were intertwined, and 
one man’s failure was another man’s disaster.      
 The views and experiences of these Spanish merchants allows us to paint a more 
general and theoretical picture. We have seen that their perception of the war, and 
consequently their actual experiences were the result of a process. This process consisted of 
an interplay between their pre-existing beliefs about the world around them and the material 
reality that was constantly pulling them down to earth. Having all been born and raised in 
Spain, it is only natural that this mental framework that bound together ideas, political views, 
superstitions and metaphysical notions, stereotypes and prejudices largely coincided with the 
one that was prevalent in their fatherland. This set of ideas was of course socially inscribed 
and therefore bound to transformation, should their social background be dramatically 
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contradictive to these ideas. Such was their everyday lives in Antwerp, putting their previous 
perceptions to the test. The disaster war brought upon their businesses and lives on the one 
hand, and its cruel nature on the other, challenged their initial understandings and depictions 
of the rebellion. The crude reality mediated the effects of Spanish propagandistic literature 
and exposed its very nature as normative rather than representative of the average sixteenth-
century Spaniard mindset. Indeed, chroniclers and playwrights depicted their compatriots as 
fervent patriots, valiant, invincible, bloodthirsty, yet noble and chivalrous. The letters sent by 
Spanish merchants living in the Low Countries shows how distant these depictions were from 
reality.            
 It is therefore fair to assume that nothing was the same for them after this war. Some, 
such as Curiel or de Añastro, put their lives at risk, and the vast majority had to leave the Low 
Countries. Not a single day passed without them drowning in fear and concern regarding the 
ongoing events. As a result, they became more cynical and less idealistic in their 
understanding of the world around them. Abstaining from making any overly-patriotic 
comments, from attributing any metaphysical abilities to their compatriots, or from glorifying 
war, their words were no longer in line with those of the chroniclers and play-writers. Since 
the latter had never been to the Low Countries (even if they had, they were no longer there), 
they did not experience the shock of the Revolt. This small community of Spanish merchants 
in the Low Countries consists a unique group indeed. They were literate but not scholars, had 
an official legal status without being agents of the Crown, were torn between their economic 
interests and their affinity to their patria, and they were witnesses to the war but yet were 
distant from the military culture. Their views can help us understand the perplexity of war as a 
social phenomenon           
 There are of course limitations to studying the correspondence of a limited number of 
persons, each one with his particular personality and unique way of expressing himself, or 
even with his own interests. While this objection seems legitimate, there are a number of 
commonalities and consistencies that uncover a pattern which can help us see beyond these 
obstacles. It seems that the first months or years that a merchant spent in Antwerp were 
characterized by a certain freshness, an eagerness to endure war and a willingness to suffer 
through its effects for the greater good of la patria. This enthusiasm is evident in their letters, 
which barely talk about anything other than the war. (Cevallos, Varrón, even Cuéllar) 
Nevertheless, all of them gradually come to forge a different perception of the Dutch Revolt. 
They all expressed the same concerns, shared the same fears, and had the same hopes. Their 
similar status added to this as well. Those of higher status communicated with Ruiz rather 
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sporadically and did not seem to take any interest in the war; all they spoke about was their 
business.           
 In addition, what the merchants do not say is as important as what they do mention. A 
number of important events, the outcomes of crucial battles, the fates of commanders such as 
Alba and Requesens, and almost all the actions of the rebels were excluded from their 
narrations. We can only speculate as to why, particularly since on several occasions they refer 
to things that had even less to do with their business. The answer certainly does not rest on a 
supposedly limited network of information, as the merchants had proven themselves to be as 
informed as any other well-connected person living in the Low Countries. Surely we can 
attribute these omissions to a lack of interest in those particular events, but this is rather 
contradictory to their general behaviour, and seems to clash with the pattern of news they sent 
to Ruiz. A study comparing the letters of these merchants to the information merchants of 
other nations passed on to their partner in Medina del Campo could potentially shed light on 
this issue.           
 Equally uncertain is the legitimacy of their writing. We have seen that in the 
correspondence culture of that era it was customary for these letters to be read out loud and 
for their content to be shared with others. In this context, our merchants’ views had to align 
by-and-large with those of their readers, and they had to appear as if they condoned Philip's 
strategies, even if the writers did not. After all, they were obviously aware of Ruiz’s opinions 
on the topics they speak about and it is more than likely that they moderated theirs in order to 
convey their messages. In addition, it is difficult to determine if they were open and frank 
about their economic situation, as they were speaking to a partner in the eyes of whom they 
had to appear trustworthy, credible and successful. Furthermore, they did not wish to come 
across as either too busy to accommodate him or sufficiently secure economically so as to not 
require him to pull some strings for them on occasion.      
 Finally, any extrapolating from this case to other groups of Spanish merchants in the 
Low Countries must be undertaken with caution, as Antwerp's particular position and its 
turbulent history provided our group with a very particular social background. Consequently, 
Spanish merchants who were living in other cities of the region, such as Bruges, may have 
had different yet still comparable experiences. The same can be said about other mercantile 
groups living in the Low Countries. Nation, religion, specialisation, and economic status all 
mediated merchants’ experiences of the war. Studying and understanding the differences in 
the particular situations of merchants, and pinpointing events such as the Spanish Fury or the 
recapture of Antwerp in 1585 that had little impact on the lives of residents of other cities, 
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while at the same time taking into account general problems such as money shortages or 
closed ports, is pivotal if we aspire to construct a more comprehensive image of the lives of 
businessmen in wartime. 
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